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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will examine the history of the geographic area comprising Western 
Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and Northern Bukovina) through its 
political, military, and religious/cultural aspects, during a turbulent period 
characterized by violent political changes, war, and extreme ethnic/ideological 
animosity.          
 Beginning with an overview concerning the origins of the Ukrainian 
nationalism, I will then focus on its primary exponents in the examined period: the 
OUN, the UPA and the Greek-Catholic Church that eventually became the "spiritual" 
pillar of the movement.        
 I continue with the issue of collaborationism during the German occupation, 
including the participation of Ukrainians in the implementation of the Holocaust, in 
anti-partisan operations, and the culmination of their commitment with the formation 
of the 14.Waffen-Grenadier-Division SS 'Galizien'.     
 Furthermore, I will examine the violent shift of regional control, leading to a 
titanic war of extermination: the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviet occupation 
of Western Ukraine (1939-1941), the Nazi invasion and occupation (1941-1944), Red 
Army's counteroffensive and the recapture of the region (1944), the final fate of 
Ukrainian collaborators following the retreating Germans (1944-1945), and the 
localized insurgency fought between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Soviet state 
(1944-1956).          
 Finally, I close my thesis with a brief mention about the Ukrainian nationalist 
movement's legacy today, and its catalyst role in the unfolding Ukrainian crisis since 
November 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER ONE: POLAND'S COLLAPSE AND THE RESURGENCE 
OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1939-1941 ............................................... 10 
THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT AND THE POLISH CAMPAIGN ................... 10 
THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF WESTERN UKRAINE .. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
THE UKRAINIAN-GERMAN CONNECTION AND THE SPLIT OF OUN ............. Error! 
Bookmark not defined. 
CHAPTER TWO: WESTERN UKRAINE UNDER AXIS 
OCCUPATION, 1941-1944 ............................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 
OPERATION BARBAROSSA ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
THE "NEW ORDER" IN WESTERN UKRAINE ................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY ......................................................................... 30 
THE SS-GALIZIEN DIVISION ............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
CHAPTER THREE: UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM'S FIGHT FOR 
SURVIVAL, 1944-1945 ............................................................................................... 41 
THE BATTLE FOR WESTERN UKRAINE – KAMENETS-PODOLSK, TARNOPOL, 
KOVEL, BRODY ............................................................................................................... 41 
FINAL BATTLES AND SURRENDER OF THE SS-GALIZIEN ...... Error! Bookmark not 
defined. 
CHAPTER FOUR: SOVIET SUPPRESSION AND UKRAINIAN 
NATIONALIST REVIVAL, 1944-2013 ................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1944-1956 ........... Error! Bookmark not 
defined. 
TODAY'S LEGACY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT ............ Error! 
Bookmark not defined. 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my mother Chrysi Vasiou-Kassara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2013-2014 crisis brought Ukraine on the spotlight. On November 2013, Prime 
Minister Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the 
European Union triggered a national revolution – the Euromaidan – leading to a 
veritable coup d' etat, bringing his overthrow. Riots and clashes between pro-Western 
and pro-Russian protesters raged throughout Ukraine claiming lives on either side. 
Later on, we had the controversial Crimean referendum of 16
th
 March 2014 and the 
outbreak of a localized civil war in the Donbass that is still being waged with 
fluctuating intensity, despite undertaken efforts to maintain a ceasefire.  
 This typical proxy-war case is surfacing again the age-old question in 
Ukrainian history: which direction this country will follow. Most of Ukraine's past is 
a tug-of-war between East and West. 
Ukraine, Russia, and Belorussia share common origins through their Rus' ancestry.
 One of the first Rus' rulers, Oleg, captured Kiev in 880 AD, proclaiming it 
"mother of the Rus' cities".
1
 It was the birth of Kievan Rus', the medieval state that 
Ukraine, Russia, and Belorussia claim as their ethnic/historical/cultural ancestor. A 
towering event in Rus' history was the adoption of Greek Christianity by Grand-
Prince Vladimir the Great, in 989, and the close ties he developed with Byzantium.
 By the 14
th 
century, Kievan Rus' experienced political fragmentation and was 
swept by the Mongol invasions. The Mongols – or Tatars (Golden Horde khanate) – 
and the Poles-Lithuanians (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) subdued or 
incorporated the Rus' principalities.       
 The Rus' principality of Galicia-Volhynia was divided between Poland and 
Lithuania. From 1375, the Poles sought to assimilate the Ruthenian population and 
spread Roman-Catholicism. Additionally, Poles, Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and 
Jews came and settled. By the 17
th 
century Galicia-Volhynia had profoundly changed 
in cultural and religious terms.
2
 
In late 18
th
 century, the Three Partitions of Poland, led to the division of Western 
Ukraine, with Austria annexing Galicia, and Russia Volhynia.
3
 
Throughout the 19
th
 century Austria and Russia tried manipulating the emerging 
"Ruthenianism". Although the lines within this movement were blurred, there were 
                                                          
1
 Dimitri, Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453, (New York and 
Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p.181  
2
 Linguistic and cultural influences from Poland and Central Europe were strong. Additionally, the 
areal Eastern Orthodox metropolises endorsed the so-called Unia, accepting the Pope as their head, and 
being in full communion with the Roman-Catholic Church. These metropolises are collectively 
described as Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva ("Greek-Catholic Church"). 
3
 The Habsburgs renamed their new dominions as Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria in 1772, with 
Lvov (Lemberg in German) remaining the capital. In 1774, Austria annexed Bukovina from the 
Ottoman Empire. Russia formed the Volhynian Governorate in 1796, with Zhitomir as its capital. 
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three main currents: The Old Ruthenianists, an elitist circle of non-Polonized nobles 
and Greek-Catholic clergymen. The Russophiles, propagating Russian unity "from the 
Carpathians to Kamchatka."
4
 The Ukrainophiles, that from the Kharkov University 
and the Saints Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in Kiev, envisioned to 
liberalize/federalize the Russian Empire or created a separate Ukrainian state. 
Prominent Russophiles were Denis Zubrytsky, Nikolay Kmicykevich, Nikolai Gogol, 
Ivan Naumovich, and Yakov Holovatsky. Influential Ukrainophile figures were Taras 
Shevchenko, Nikolay Kostomarov, Myhkailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, and 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky.        
 The Habsburgs initially tolerated both movements to undermine Polish 
dominance in Galicia-Lodomeria. By the 1870s, the Tsar persecuted the Ukrainophile 
intelligentsia, prohibiting the print and use of the "Little Russian" language with the 
Ems Ukaz decree (1876). Eventually, Austria provided a haven for the purged 
Ukrainophiles in Galicia, considering them useful against the Poles and Russia's 
increasing influence.          
 By early 20
th
 century, two pivotal events marked the development of 
Ukrainian nationalism. The first, was the publishing of an article by the historian 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky, in 1904, titled 'The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History 
and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs', 
proclaiming the Ukrainian nation-building, while dismantling the traditional Russian 
historiography. The second was the enthronement of Andrey Sheptytsky – a Polish-
Ruthenian aristocrat – as Metropolitan Archbishop of Lvov. Thus far, the Uniate 
Church was suspicious to any new movement, fearing the spread of subversive ideas. 
However, the new ecclesiastical leader would endorse the nationalist cause, 
transforming the Greek-Catholic Church to its spiritual pillar. 
On 3 August 1914, in Lemberg, several Galician political leaders formed the General 
Ukrainian Council, calling their countrymen to fight for Austria-Hungary in World 
War One. Subsequently, the Ukrayinski Sichovi Striltsi ("Ukrainian Sich Riflemen") 
were formed, consisted of 2,500 volunteers.       
 The multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary was plagued by centrifugal tendencies; 
Slavic soldiers deserted their posts or even joined the Russians. Amidst the chaos, 
Hungarian soldiers committed atrocities against the Ruthenians, while Russophiles in 
Galicia-Lodomeria were executed or deported to concentration camps.  
 In September 1914-May 1915, the Russians occupied Galicia. Grand Duke 
Nikolai Nikolayevich, the Tsar's uncle, hailed the Galicians as brothers who had 
"languished for centuries under a foreign yoke."
5
 Despite propaganda, however, 
Russian rule was harsh, while the mutual hatred between Russophiles and 
Ukrainophiles became abysmal.       
 Nevertheless, by September 1915, a German counteroffensive saved Austro-
                                                          
4
 Stepan, Rudnitsky, Ukraine: The Land and its People, (New York: Rand & McNally Co., 1918), 
p.155 
5
 Ukraine on the Road to Freedom, published by the Ukrainian National Committee of the United 
States, 1919, pp.41-2 
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Hungary from collapse, pushing back the frontline.     
 The Russophiles fled with the retreating Russians. In 1916, Ukrainian 
parliamentarians under the prominent lawyer Yevhen Petrushevych (1863-1940) 
declared to Vienna their will for greater autonomy. 
By early 1917, Russia and Austria-Hungary were totally exhausted by the war, and 
have suffered huge losses.        
 On 8 March, a huge demonstration took place in Petrograd, forcing Tsar 
Nikolai II to abdicate. Prince Georgy Lvov and Alexander Kerensky formed a 
provisional government, while the far-leftist Bolshevik political group, under Vladimir 
Lenin and Lev Trotsky, gathered momentum. On 7 November 1917, 40,000 
Bolsheviks stormed Petrograd Winter Palace in a historical takeover, plunging Russia 
to chaos and civil war. 
Meanwhile in Kiev, political activists had established, by March, the Ukrayinska 
Tsentralna Rada ("Ukrainian Central Council"). Mykhailo Hrushevsky became its 
head, and his Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party (USRP) was dominant. Their 
appeal for greater autonomy and a unilateral declaration of independence were 
rejected by the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks respectively.  
 Following earlier contacts, in February 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary 
recognized Ukrainian independence. In return, Ukraine would provide its surplus of 
foodstuff and agricultural production.
6
 Additionally, the Bolsheviks, striving to 
consolidate their internal rule, signed the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the 
Central Powers, on 3 March, under heavy terms.     
 The Rada's inability to provide the supplies infuriated the Germans who 
installed a new regime, on 29 April 1918, under "Hetman" Pavlo Skoropadsky (1873-
1945) a Russian-speaking Cossack General. Nevertheless, on 11 November, the 
Central powers signed an armistice, and their Ukrainian puppet-state fell apart. 
 The Directory – a coalition of Skoropadsky's enemies – under Symon Petlyura 
(1879-1926), entered Kiev. 
Galician parliamentarians and Uniate clergymen formed in Lvov, on 1 November 
1918, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR).
7
 Polish reaction was 
immediate and by 22 November they controlled Lvov. A resurrected Second Polish 
Republic, under her warlord Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), strove to reconquer her old 
dominions.          
 The Galicians formed a new national council, while Petrushevych was elected 
dictator of the republic in June 1919. However, his poor relations with Petlyura 
forced him to flee to Vienna.       
 Polish troops invaded Volhynia in December, fighting against all Ukrainian 
factions. By July 1919, the Galicians withdrew beyond River Zbruch, ending the 
eight-month Polish-Galician War. 
                                                          
6
 Sir John, Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk the Forgotten Peace, March 1918, (St. Martin's Street 
London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1938),  p.220 
7
 Paul, Kubicek, The history of Ukraine, (Westport, Connecticut.: Greenwood Press, 2008), p.86 
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Although the 1919-1920 peace treaties probated Germany's defeat and Austria-
Hungary's dissolution, the war in Eastern Europe continued unabated. The Bolsheviks 
were defeating the Whites-Counterrevolutionaries, and repelled the Entente's 
intervention. Now, they turned their attention to Poland.    
 The first Polish-Soviet skirmishes occurred in Volhynia on February 1919. In 
April 1920, Petlyura and Pilsudski joined forces against the Bolsheviks. However, the 
Soviet counteroffensive swept them, and, by August, Trotsky's Red Army stood at the 
gates of Warsaw.       
 Nonetheless, an all-out Polish counterattack repelled them. The Poles 
advanced until the line Tarnopol-Dubno-Minsk-Drisa in late September.
8
 The Treaty 
of Riga, on 18 March 1921 ended the war. Galicia and Volhynia were incorporated to 
Poland.        
Although defeated, the Ukrainian nationalist movement has matured. Hrushevsky's 
nation-building narrative had found native and foreign disciples. The Ukrainian 
diaspora in North America was actively involved in promoting the cause. Already by 
September 1893, Father Hryhorii Hrushka, established the 'Svoboda' ("Freedom") 
newspaper in New Jersey. Increasing numbers of published material were available in 
English and German.       
 Intellectuals like Bedwin Sands and Stepan Rudnitsky propagated with an 
increased anti-Russian rhetoric, claiming that the Ukrainians were not just a separate 
ethnos from the Russians, but the true heirs of the Rus' since the "Russians or 
Muscovites", are "a mixed Mongolo-Finno-Slav race",
9
 while Kievan Rus' was "the 
old Ukrainian empire of Kiev."
10
       
 Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973) an ex-socialist journalist, turned ardent 
nationalist with fascist inclinations, became the movement's ideological mentor. His 
ideas combined traditional nationalism with racism and anti-Semitism. Dontsov 
propagated the use of all means to achieve the Ukrainian independence, and infused a 
fervently anti-Russian and anti-Polish sentiment. His works were the foundation of 
modern Ukrainian nationalist ideology. 
In Prague, on July-August 1920, veterans of the Sich Riflemen, and their former 
commander, Colonel Yevhen Konovalets (1891-1938), founded the Ukrayinska 
Viyskova Orhanizatsiya ("Ukrainian Military Organization" – UVO).11 UVO's aim 
was to achieve independence by force.      
 Throughout the 1920s, UVO committed terrorist acts against local Poles and 
Galician collaborators, torched farms of Polish colonists, and sabotaged the 
transportation and communication lines.
12
 In 25 September 1921, an unsuccessful 
                                                          
8
 Michael S. Neiberg & David Jordan, The History of World War I: The Eastern Front 1914-1920: 
From Tannenberg to the Russo-Polish War, (London: Amber Books, 2008), p.219 
9
 Sands, Bedwin, The Ukraine: Reprint of a Lecture Delivered on Ukrainian History and present-day 
Political Problems, (London: Francis Griffiths, 1914), p.9 
10
 Rudnitsky, op. cit., p.150 
11
 Anatoly V., Kentii, Ukrayinska Viyskova Orhanizatsiya (UVO) ve 1920-1928 rr.: Korotkyi Narys, 
(Kyiv: Institut Istorii Ukrayin NAN Ukrayin, 1998), p.14 
12
 Ibid., p.32 
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attempt was made against Pilsudski whilst he visited Lvov. Passive resistance 
included boycotting the whole spectrum of occupational policies.  
 Warsaw's response was the "pacification" campaign, in 1930. Police and 
cavalry units combed the countryside, mistreating and incarcerating thousands. In 
Volhynia, armed bands of Polish colonists destroyed Orthodox temples, while 
terrorizing the Ukrainians to embrace Catholicism. 
The historical moment for the movement came when the First Congress, held in 
Vienna from 28 January-3 February 1929, merged the militant youths and UVO 
veterans to the Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv ("Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists" – OUN).13 Konovalets was elected its first leader, and OUN's 
goals were to continue the struggle against the "oppressors of the Ukrainian nation".
 In July 1935, Warsaw struck the "normalization" agreement, making 
considerable political and economic concessions in Galicia-Volhynia. This political 
maneuver achieved the political neutralization of Galicia's moderate right-wing 
elements, while the OUN accused the compromisers as turncoats.   
 Nevertheless, the coming cataclysmic conflict will unleash the suppressed 
hatred and violence would reach nightmarish dimensions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 D. V., Vedeneyev & H. S., Bystrukhin, Mech i Tryzub: Rozvidka I Korntrrozvidka ruhu 
Ukrayinskikh Natsionalistiv ta UPA, (Kyiv: Heneza, 2006), p.108 
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CHAPTER ONE: POLAND'S DISINTEGRATION AND 
THE RESURGENCE OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 
1939-1941 
 
THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT AND THE POLISH CAMPAIGN 
The bloodless triumphs of Austria's Anschluß ("Annexation"), in March, and the 
takeover of Sudetenland, in September 1938 – following the infamous Munich 
Agreement –14 furtherly emboldened the German dictator Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). 
His next targets were Danzig, and the Polish Corridor. However, their annexation 
meant certain war with Poland.
15
 France had signed military pacts with Poland (1921) 
and Czechoslovakia (1924).
16
 Although Czechoslovakia was betrayed in Munich, a 
German attack on Poland equaled with toppling the post-1918 European order, 
something intolerable for the Franco-British.      
 Hitler's main concern was to avoid a repetition of a two-front war. Only with 
Iosif Stalin's (1879-1953) Soviet Union could Berlin reach a compromise; but it was a 
complicated issue.        
 From its origins, National-Socialism placed itself as diametrically opposed to 
Communism. USSR was a mass of Slavic untermenschen ("sub-humans") ruled by 
"Jewish-Bolshevik" masters. Additionally, there was the concept of Lebensraum,
17
 
and the Anti-Comnitern Pact.
18
 Yet German-Soviet relations were not immune to 
Realpolitik.          
 The Weimar Republic and the Bolsheviks had renounced their mutual 
territorial and financial claims with the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922), and, under a 
secret agreement, officers of the Reichswehr could conduct banned military drills in 
Soviet Russia.
19
 Bilateral economic relations rose steadily throughout the 1920s, 
peaking at 1,431 billion Rubles in 1932 – with the initiation of Stalin's Five-Year Plan 
– representing 46.5% of total Soviet imports.20     
                                                          
14
 The Munich Agreement, held on 30 September 1938, was a settlement reached between Germany, 
Britain, France, and Italy, allowing Germany to annex Sudetenlad – parts of western Czechoslovakia 
populated by ethnic Germans. 
15
 On 26 January 1934, Germany and Poland have signed a 10-year pact of non-aggression. Hitler 
unilaterally abrogated it on 28 April 1939. 
16
 USSR had joined the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance in 1935. However, a special protocol 
preconditioned France to take first action in assisting Czechoslovakia before the Soviet Union could 
intervene. 
17
 Since the 1920s, Hitler in his book Mein Kampf ("My Struggle") had stressed the need for expansion 
in European Russia so that Germany could acquire the necessary living-space and resources to attain 
world-power status. 
18
 This was an anti-Communist pact signed by Germany and Japan, on 25 November 1936, directed 
against the Third Internationale. 
19
 John, Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-political History, 1918-1941, Third Edition 
(London: Routledge, 2001) p.155 
20
 Edward E., Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941, 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999),  p.14 
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 German-Soviet economic interaction plummeted after the Nazis assumed 
power. However, Hitler's enormous rearmament programs of 1935 – openly violating 
the Versailles' treaty – required an abundant supply of resources that only the USSR 
could provide.          
 The course to war became inevitable when the Wehrmacht occupied Prague 
and Memel on 16 and 23 March 1939 respectively. Czechoslovakia was rendered to a 
protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and an "independent" pro-Nazi Slovakia. 
London responded by summoning the Polish Foreign Minister and declaring British 
guarantee on Poland's territorial integrity.     
 Despite pompous rhetoric, all German military and economic studies revealed 
that the Reich was doomed without a secured supply of resources and USSR's 
neutrality.          
 On March 10 1939, Stalin, in his speech celebrating the 18
th 
Party Congress in 
Moscow, stressed that the Soviet Union did not propose "to pull others' chestnuts of 
the fire for them."
21
 Vyacheslav Molotov's (1890-1986) appointment, on May, as the 
new Soviet Foreign Minister, indicated that Moscow was ready to do serious business 
with Berlin.          
 Nevertheless, up to July, Stalin had both the Germans and the Franco-British 
competing on which will make the highest bidder for USSR's participation or 
neutrality in the coming war. At the end Franco-British rejection on Moscow's 
demand of returning the Baltic States into her orbit, and Poland's refusal to allow the 
Red Army entering her territory, decided the outcome. Hitler conceded in all Stalin's 
geopolitical demands. On 23 August, the Reich's Foreign Minister, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop (1893-1946) flew to Moscow.      
 After 24 hours of hectic negotiations, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 
was signed, coming as a complete surprise to a shocked world. Both dictators boasted 
to their associates for outsmarting the other side.    
 Besides the formal commitment of mutual non-belligerence and neutrality in 
the event of a conflict with a third party, there was a secret protocol detailing the 
respective spheres of influences in Eastern Europe. Anticipating wider "territorial and 
political re-arrangements", the boundaries of German-Soviet influences begun from 
the northern borders of Lithuania, running through the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers 
in Poland, ending at the Polish-Slovak border. Berlin declared "its complete political 
disinterestedness" to the Soviet "interest" in Bessarabia.
22
 
Poland, due to Franco-British hesitations mobilized 700,000 soldiers, literally, at the 
last moment. Already from late August, German agents and cadres of the 
Brandenburg unit, conducted subversive operations in western and southern Poland.
23
 
The pre-planned provocations, providing Berlin the pretext, took place on 31 August, 
when SS (Schutzstaffel – "protection-squadron") troops in Polish uniforms, attacked 
                                                          
21
 Joachim, Remak, The Origins of the Second World War, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1976), p.107 
22
 Ibid., pp.115-6 
23
 Steve, Zaloga; Howard, Gerrard, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2002), p.36 
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the Gleiwitz radio station and broadcasted inflammatory propaganda, urging Upper 
Silesia's Polish minority, to revolt against Hitler. The invasion commenced at around 
04:00 hours, in 1 September 1939, with the shelling of Danzig's Polish military depot 
of Westerplatte, by a German battleship. Meanwhile, within the city, SS and 
paramilitary units attacked the local Polish militia; after the takeover, most of the 
captured Poles were shot.        
 On 3 September, Britain and France declared war on Germany, World War 
Two had just begun.         
 The main axis of the German attack was from the west; the armies of East 
Prussia and the south would have complementary role. The ultimate goal was all 
major thrusts to converge in Warsaw.       
 Despite spirited Polish resistance, German numerical/technical/tactical 
superiority quickly overwhelmed the defensive deployment. By 3 September, the 
Germans had crossed the Warta, and reached the Vistula and Narew rivers. On 6 
September, the Polish High-Command was transferred to Brest-Litovsk causing panic 
to Warsaw's citizens. Two days later, elements of the 4
th 
Panzer Division probed into 
Warsaw's Ochota suburb, but they were rebuked.
24
 Nevertheless, the siege of Warsaw 
began on 15 September, and, nine days later, 1,150 German airplanes bombed the 
city.           
 After the battles of Bzura and Lodz, Polish resistance was essentially 
neutralized, and the Wehrmacht surrounded Warsaw. On 25, September, the city was 
mercilessly bombarded by artillery and airplanes. Hitler refused to permit a civilian 
evacuation to put additional pressure on the defenders.
25
    
 On the evening of 26 September 1939, General Juliusz Rommel, Warsaw's 
commander, sent envoys to discuss surrender terms. The siege ended formally on the 
next day. 40,000 civilians were killed, and 140,000 Polish soldiers became prisoners.
 The Poles had hoped to withdraw into a final stronghold called Romanian 
Bridgehead,
26
 anticipating help from the West. However, Franco-British inaction – 
leading to the so-called Phony War – and the Soviet invasion shattered all hopes. 
 
THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF WESTERN UKRAINE 
Moscow watched in awe while the Germans crushed Poland, by employing an 
innovative kind of warfare, dubbed Blitzkrieg ("lighting-war") by an American 
journalist. Until mid-September the Soviets were pre-occupied, defeating the Japanese 
incursion in Khalkin-Gol in Soviet Far East. After deliberations, Molotov devised a 
plausible scheme: Poland ceased to exist as a state; thus, previous bilateral treaties 
were nullified. The Red Army would intervene to save the lives and properties of 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., p.70 
25
 Ibid., p.78 
26
 The Przedmoscie rumunskie was as last-stand defensive area, roughly encompassing Galicia, next to 
the Romanian borders, being supplied through Romania's Black Sea ports. The Polish leadership 
planned to hold the German onslaught until a major Franco-British offensive was launched in the West. 
 13 
 
Western Belorussians and Ukrainians.      
 On 17 September 1939, the Red Army crossed the border. After some 
skirmishes with weak, underequipped Polish units, they advanced unhindered. There 
was great confusion due to Warsaw's ambiguous stance towards the Soviets; some 
Polish units received orders not to fight. In Rovno and Tarnopol, local Poles even 
greeted them as allies.
27
 In Lvov, two Gebirgsjäger (German mountain troops) 
divisions were halted by dogged Polish resistance. The intervention of Soviet tanks 
from the east prompted the Poles to surrender on 22 September.   
 Moscow tried to present her actions as a liberation campaign. The deployed 
forces were named as Ukrainian Front, under Red Army's Ukrainian Marshal 
Semyon Tymoshenko. Although Soviet agents have infiltrated the area before 17 
September to organize the reception, many of the population were truly cheered by 
their advance.
28
 In fact, most Galicians were glad to see Poland collapsing. The OUN 
saw two opportunities: the unification of Ukraine, and a chance to strike Poles and 
Jews. The latter had a mixed stance towards the Soviets: some – mostly the youth – 
were sympathetic, while other – especially property-owners in urban centers – showed 
apprehension. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was reported saying, "We occupied only a 
few rooms on the ground floor until recently, and now we have it all to ourselves. 
There is still a tenant on the first floor, but when we push him out the entire house 
will finally be ours."
29
        
 A wave of violence spread in Eastern Poland by the vacuum of authority. 
Retreating Polish troops retaliated to subversive actions by Ukrainians, Belorussians, 
and Jews.
30
 Additionally, in Rovno, Ukrainian and Jewish militias clashed briefly 
before the Soviets occupied it. Furthermore, in Tarnopol, groups of Polish soldiers 
who resisted the Red Army were summarily executed, after being captured.  
An event epitomizing the Nazi-Soviet cooperation occurred when the Wehrmacht 
handed over Brest-Litovsk to the Red Army.
31
 However, there were re-arrangements 
in the occupation zones. Stalin proposed the extension of German rule to the entire 
Warsaw and Lublin voivodeships, in exchange of Lithuania. It was ratified with the 
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, signed on 28 September 1939 in 
Moscow.
32
 
Meanwhile, the NKVD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del – "People's 
Commmissariat of Internal Affairs") secret police was rounding up Polish officers, 
intellectuals, officials, and clergymen that in next year would be executed in the 
                                                          
27
 Jan T., Gross, Revolution from abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and 
Western Belorussia, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998),  p.23 
28
 Ibid., pp.29-30 
29
 Ibid., p.31 
30
 Ibid., pp.19-20 
31
 Brest-Litovsk was captured by the Germans on 17 September 1939. After a ceremonial joint parade, 
inspected by General Heinz Guderian and Colonel Semyon Krivoshein, the city formally passed under 
Soviet control. 
32
 Gross, op. cit., p.85 
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Katyn forest, near Smolensk and other locations.
33
 An even greater wave of violence 
ensued, representing a mixture of personal and ethno-religious enmities engulfing 
entire communities. Thousands of Poles were killed – often in brutal and primitive 
ways – and their properties were looted or destroyed. Even Soviet officers and 
political commissars encouraged the peasants – especially the local Communists – to 
avenge the long years of Polish oppression.
34
 It seems that, for a while, the Galicians 
would be allowed to make their own "revolution" against the hated Polish 'pany' 
("masters"). Many Poles fled to the wilderness to save themselves.   
 When the dust of conquest settled, "provisional administrations" and "peasant 
committees" were set up in cities and villages respectively, for holding elections. Of 
course, ex-officials in the Polish administration or well-to-do peasants were excluded 
from participating. In fact, the lists were already prepared, and most of the candidates 
came from Soviet Ukraine.         
 The elections, held on 22 October 1939, resulted in the formation of a People's 
Assembly under Kyryl Studynsky (1868-1941), a prominent academician and leading 
figure of the Christian Social Party in Ukraine. A delegate went to Moscow, under 
Studynsky, asking the unification of Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine. On 
November 15 1939, Galicia and Volhynia were officially incorporated to the USSR.
 All state and economic infrastructures (industry, banks) were nationalized. As 
for the Greek-Catholic Church, though not formally persecuted, there was an effort to 
limit its great influence upon the populace. Church publications were banned, religion 
teaching and religious symbols were removed from schools, and church incomes from 
land or real estate were cut-off.
35
 The Volhynian Orthodox Church faced similar 
restrictions and was forced to subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, 
the church survived.         
 There was also a policy of "Ukrainization" and "de-Polonization", 
implemented in elementary and high schools, as well as in the University of Lvov – 
an age-old bastion of Polish culture – that was renamed to Ivan Franko University.
 Moscow decided to eliminate the – largely Polish – landowning peasantry. By 
February 1940, the collectivization campaign was in full swing. All over Western 
Ukraine and Belorussia, landowners, wealthy peasants, and Polish colonists were 
chased out of their properties. Much of the vacated land was redistributed to 
neighboring villages. Official Soviet statistics shows that in October-November 1939, 
2,564 landowners in Nowogrod voivodeship had their property confiscated. In Lvov, 
Tarnopol, and Stanislawow voivodeships, 717,000, 213,000, and 67,718 hectares of 
land were redistributed.
36
        
 Additionally, there were imposed regulations and ordinances. It was forbidden 
to travel without official authorization. There was a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and all 
civilian-held weapons should be surrendered. Shopkeepers were obliged to sell in 
prewar prices, and radios were confiscated. Books or periodicals with "unwanted" 
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content should be disposed, and all symbols of Polish statehood were to be forthwith 
removed.          
 A notable curiosity was the shopping-spree by Red Army servicemen and 
officials in urban centers like Lvov, Tarnopol, and Rovno, purchasing goods and 
items, otherwise unattainable in the closed Soviet system. 
 
THE UKRAINIAN-GERMAN CONNECTION AND THE SPLIT OF OUN 
The recognition of Polish rule in Galicia-Volhynia by the Entente, in 1923, was a 
heavy blow for the UVO. Many of its members left disillusioned turning moderate, 
while Konovalets and his hardliners fled abroad.     
 The self-exiled faction – named Provid – resided mostly in Germany, and was 
primarily comprised of veteran officers providing guidance to the younger adherents 
in Galicia.          
 Contacts between Germany and the UVO can be traced back to September 
1920, when Yevhen Levitsky, representative of the WUPR in Berlin, came in contact 
with circles showing sympathy to the Ukrainian cause.
37
 Konovalets in 1921-22 
stressed that Germany was primarily concerned with revising the Versailles' treaty, 
and undermining Poland's sovereignty. Thus, the two sides shared common interests. 
Moreover, Konovalets met with Walther Nicolai, head of the Abwehr (German 
military intelligence), and, in 1932, he received 200,000 Reichsmarks as aid for the 
movement.
38
          
 Besides an increasing dependency on Germany – especially after the Nazis 
came in power – the Provid tried maintaining a network throughout Central and 
Western Europe. But a constant channel of communication existed with the Abwher 
and its head Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887-1945).     
 A first test for the German-Ukrainian relations came with Czechoslovakia's 
takeover. The Rusyns of Carpatho-Ukraine, unlike their brethren in Galicia, did not 
experienced oppression throughout the Interbellum period, and even enjoyed a degree 
of self-autonomy conceded by the Czechoslovak government. However, in October 
1938, under German encouragement, the local nationalists – most of them members or 
sympathizers of the OUN – declared Carpatho-Ukraine, a "free, federated state",39 
forming a military unit called the Carpathian Sich, with an effective strength of 2,000 
men. The Rusyns skirmished with the Czechoslovak troops and managed to repel 
them.          
 Nevertheless, in March 1939, Hungary claimed Carpatho-Ukraine as an old 
region of hers. Magyar troops invaded, and the Rusyns, after offering brief resistance, 
were overwhelmed. 
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The OUN suffered a critical blow when Konovalets was assassinated in Rotterdam, 
on 23 May 1938, by Pavel Sudoplatov, a Soviet agent under Stalin's direct order. This 
disaster exposed the widening drift between the self-exiled leadership and the home 
factions. Already before Konovalets' death, there were visible cracks, but his authority 
managed to handle the situation.       
 The Provid held its Second Congress in Rome, on August 1939, denouncing 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and formally choosing Andriy Melnyk (1890-1964) as 
the new head of the OUN. Called "Lord Melnyk" because of his chivalrous and 
composure temperament, he was a veteran officer of the Sich Riflemen, founding 
member of the OUN, and close associate of Konovalets. His appointment, was a turn 
to moderation and reconciliation with the Greek-Catholic Church – still the most 
influential organization of the Galician society – disregarding the strong anti-clerical 
– if not anti-Christian – sentiments within the OUN. The new head of the OUN was 
hailed by Bishop Avgustyn Voloshyn, Catholic leader of Carpatho-Ukraine.
40
 
 However, the radical faction in Galicia, and especially the youth, preferred 
Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) and his supporters to lead. This drift had profound 
causes. All but two members of the Provid were career officers having served in the 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian armies, conducting themselves in a strict code of 
military honor; thus, unwilling to fully endorse extremism. Moreover, the older 
generation had established a short-lived Ukrainian state and army, having fought in a 
recognized manner. The younger generation had experienced only the ambiguous 
resistance against the Poles. Being prone to radicalism and violence they harbored an 
inferiority complex towards the Provid.
41
      
 There was also an ideological differentiation: the moderates preferred Benito 
Mussolini's Fascism, while the hardliners Hitler's National-Socialism. In August 
1940, the formation of two subgroups, the OUN-M ("Melnykites") and the OUN-B 
("Banderites") signaled the breakup. Factional strife did not take long to occur. 
 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the concession of Galicia-Volhynia to 
Stalin were major blows for Germany's sympathizers. However, OUN's leadership 
believed that it was a situational compromise, and the war between the two powers 
inevitable. Most importantly, the Ukrainian nationalist shared the same enemies with 
Hitler's Germany: Poland and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Germany was the only 
major power that had offered them tangible assistance, thus far. 
Inside the German leadership there were different perspectives about the Ukrainian 
issue. Hitler coveted Ukraine's natural resources and her land for future Germanic 
colonization, while Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi "philosopher", advocated the 
utilization of any potential collaborators in the coming showdown with the Soviet 
Union. Most of the military leadership agreed with Rosenberg's views, arguing that 
sympathetic elements should not be disheartened.     
 By the summer of 1939, under Canaris encouragement, Colonel Roman 
Sushko (1894-1944), a veteran of Sich Riflemen, and Melnyk's associate, prepared a 
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cadre of 250 men, trained in Wiener-Neustadt,
42
 and in the mountainous terrain near 
Salzburg,
43
 to act as a Wehrmacht's auxiliary shock unit, and as the nucleus for a 
future Ukrainian uprising. When the Polish campaign began, Sushko's unit – based in 
Slovakia – was allowed to cross the border and enter the ethnic Ukrainian territory 
next to the San River, escorting a delegate of the Provid to the local OUN groups.
44
 
But they were soon ordered back because of the Soviet advance.   
 Following Poland's defeat, Melnyk was pressured by Berlin to order all his 
functionaries to relocate into Generalgouvernement
45
 territory, in order to avoid 
complications with the Soviets. Colonel Sushko continued to collaborate with the 
Germans forming auxiliary police units.      
 A variety of collaborationist community organizations were functioning under 
the direction of the Ukrainian National Committee in Krakow, having Volodymyr 
Kubiyovych (1900-1985), a prominent geographer and ardent nationalist, as its 
head.
46
 Additionaly, the Ukrainian church life flourished in German-occupied Poland. 
In Chelm and Podlasia regions, under Bishop Ilarion Ohienko, the Orthodox parishes 
increased to 140, while the Greek-Catholic Church west of the River San, tried to 
reverse the Russophile cultural orientation of the area.
47
 
On 8 May 1941, Rosenberg presented a memorandum assuring that "Ukraine will 
become an independent state in union with Germany".
48
 However, it was an empty 
promise, since Berlin made no formal commitment regarding the creation of a 
sovereign Ukrainian state. Nevertheless, many from both OUN factions believed that 
it was something attainable, encouraged by the examples of Slovakia and Croatia.
49
 Two Ukrainian units were formed just before the invasion of USSR, under the 
aegis of the Abwehr, the battalions "Nachtigall" and "Roland". Officially 
"Nacthigall's" enlisted men were Ukrainians while the officers Germans. However, 
there was a whole "unofficial" staff of Ukrainian officers – members of the OUN-B 
under Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950). "Roland" was formed in Austria by workers 
and students of the large Ukrainian community. Here Ukrainians had greater formal 
authority, and the OUN-B tried to have tighter control, although only half of 
"Roland's" personnel belonged to the Banderite faction.
50
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CHAPTER TWO: WESTERN UKRAINE UNDER AXIS 
OCCUPATION, 1941-1944 
 
OPERATION BARBAROSSA 
After partitioning Poland, and securing their flank, USSR and Germany forcefully 
pursued their respecting geopolitical goals.      
 On 30 November 1939, the Red Army invaded Finland, after Helsinki's refusal 
to make strategic territorial concessions to Moscow. However, the Arctic terrain, 
skillful Finnish resistance, and Soviet clumsy operational conduct, led to a debacle. 
Nevertheless, Soviet reinforces and regrouping, prompted Finland to sue for peace, on 
12 March 1940.        
 Then, USSR demanded from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to sign pacts of 
mutual military assistance with the USSR, so the latter could acquire bases in these 
countries. By late June 1940, the Baltic States were governed by pro-Soviet regimes, 
installed through rigged elections. In August, they joined the Soviet Union. 
Thousands of dissidents were deported, while others fled to the forests starting an 
insurgency.
51
 
Meanwhile, Stalin demanded the return of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, 
annexed by Romania in 1918. Bucharest conceded, and, on 28 June, the Red Army 
entered Bukovina. The Bukovinian Ukrainians were harshly suppressed by Romania 
throughout the Interwar years, and the OUN had a sizeable underground. The Soviet 
takeover triggered the flight of local nationalists to German-occupied areas. 
In the West, the Blitzkrieg was unleashed with the double German invasion of 
Denmark and Norway, on 9 April 1940. Within six hours Denmark was fully 
occupied, while Norway was conquered by 9 June.      
 In 10 May it was the turn of the Low Countries and France. Within four days 
Belgium and Holland were overrun, while the Battle of France ended with the French 
capitulation, on 22 June. The collaborationist regime of Vichy was established under 
Marshal Phillip Petain.        
 In July, the Germans launched an air campaign against Britain as a 
preliminary step before the amphibious invasion. However, the British RAF 
successfully protected the metropolis winning the battle of attrition against the 
Luftwaffe. 
The last diversion before the attack on USSR was the Balkans' campaign. By 28 
October 1940, Mussolini attacked Greece but, by March 1941, his forces were 
repelled and driven into Albania.      
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 Furthermore, while Yugoslavia seemed aligning with the Axis,
52
 a pro-British 
coup, on 27 March 1941, frustrated this prospect. An overpowering German operation 
against both countries was unleashed on 6 April. By late May, Greece and Yugoslavia 
were under Axis occupation. 
Meanwhile, the Nazis launched a multi-directional diplomatic campaign. After the 
British rejected a peace proposal on July 1940, Hitler, tried unsuccessfully, to 
persuade Spain and Vichy France to ally with Germany.   
 Berlin knew that America was increasingly supplying Britain. A protracted 
war with Britain and – sooner or later – with the USA, would require huge deliveries 
of supplies, resulting to absolute dependency on Stalin.   
 Moreover, Moscow's assertiveness and recent geopolitical acquisitions have 
brought the Soviet Air Force within striking distance to critical targets for German 
interests – Berlin, German industrial zones, Ploesti's oilfields. Both America and the 
USSR underwent massive military buildups – and it was obvious against whom these 
armadas would be unleashed – making the two-front war scenario ominously realistic.
 Nevertheless, Molotov visited Berlin on 16 November 1940, to discuss the 
future of bilateral relations. In Hitler's utopian proposals for a German-Soviet alliance, 
Molotov asked in return the evacuation of Finland by German troops, the acquirement 
of bases in Bulgaria and Turkey, an extensive sphere of influence in the Middle East, 
and Japan's renouncement in exploiting Northern Sakhalin's natural resources. 
 Hitler responded with the Führer Directive No. 21, on 18 December, ordering 
his Wehrmacht to prepare "to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign" before 
concluding the war against England.
53
 The operation's codename was Barbarossa 
after the medieval German Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa.
54
   
 Hitler believed that the Red Army would stand and fight near the line of rivers 
Prut-Dniester-Dnieper-Dvina, protecting the main economic/industrial areas, and key 
cities of Western USSR. Mauled by Stalin's purges, the Red Army could be knocked-
out through a quick, crushing blow. Thus, Eurasian resources would make Germany 
invulnerable in a protracted war against the Anglo-Americans.   
 On 30 March 1941, Hitler addressed a gathering of 200 officers, stressing that 
the coming conflict is a "clash of two ideologies", a "war of extermination". 
Additionally, on 13 May, Wilhelm Keitel, Wehrmacht's Chief-of-Staff, signed an 
order, explicitly granting German troops the right to use all measures against Soviet 
citizens, stressing the need for "ruthless and energetic actions against Bolshevik 
agitators, guerillas, saboteurs, and Jews."
55
 Keitel signed the final version of the 
notorious Commissar Order on 6 June 1941.     
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 Besides the Heer ("Army"), also the SS were preparing for the 
racial/ideological "crusade". Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942), second in command of 
the SS, organized four Einsatzgruppen composed of 600-1,000 men each, further 
subdivided into Einsatzkommandos, to accompany the army into USSR.   
 Besides the Einsatzgruppen, there were also 20,000 men in numerous 
Ordnunsgpolizei ("Order Police") and Reserve Polizei ("Reserve Police") battalions, 
as well as another 11,000 in the 1
st
 SS Infantry and SS Cavalry brigades.
56
 
Prioritizing objectives became a nightmare for the German leadership. Hitler wanted 
to destroy the Red Army and capture strategic/economic targets. The OKH advocated 
an all-out advance to Moscow to severe the nerve-center of the Soviet system. But 
USSR's sheer enormity brought second thoughts. From a one-pronged attack, it was 
decided to divide the Wehrmacht into three army groups, with a finishing line of 
advance stretching from Archangelsk to Astrakhan.
57
 
Although detailed informed by his intelligence networks, for a massive German build-
up next to his western borders, Stalin dismissed these reports, considering unlikely 
that Germany would break the non-aggression pact so soon, insisting that Britain 
remained Hitler's current priority. 
History's greatest land invasion began on 03:15 a.m., on Sunday, 22 June 1941, with 
an enormous Axis force of 3,800,000 soldiers, 3,800 tanks and 2,700 airplanes. The 
Soviets were caught largely – but not completely – by surprise.   
 In all, 153 German (120 infantry, 19 panzer, and 14 motorized), 14 Finnish, 14 
Romanian, 4 Italian, 2 Slovakian divisions, and 3 Hungarian brigades,
58
 crossed the 
border. The Red Army fielded 4,750,000 men, 20 mechanized corps – with six times 
more vehicles than the invaders – and 12,000 airplanes.59 This impressive armada was 
plagued by the lack of purged experienced officers, unfamiliarity with modern 
warfare, and largely obsolete or unserviceable hardware. 
Field-Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South deployed 972,000 men in 
Generalgouvernement and Romania. Although Germans and Romanians constituted 
the main bulk, there were also Italian, Hungarian and Slovak troops.  
 Opposing them were the Southwestern and Southern fronts, commanded by 
the generals Mikhail Kirponos (1892-1941) and Ivan Tyulenev (1892-1978) 
respectively.  Kirponos had 907,000 soldiers, 5,465 tanks and 16,997 guns. Three of 
his four armies, and four of his eight mechanized corps defended the Lvov salient.
60
 The invasion began after 03:00 a.m., when reconnaissance elements and 
Brandenburg commandos attempted, unsuccessfully, to storm Przemysl's bridge. 
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Following an artillery prelude, the 1
st 
Gebirgsjäger Division attacked Lvov. Poor 
Soviet deployment hindered an effective counterstrike. Stalin dispatched his Chief-of-
general-staff Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974) to Tarnopol.    
 On 23 June, the Germans breached the Lutsk-Rovno line, but an immediate 
breakthrough was denied by Soviet anti-tank units. The next day, the Soviet 4
th 
Mechanized Corps launched an ill-coordinated counterattack northwest of Lvov and 
was decimated. On 25, the 3
rd
 Panzer Division established a bridgehead on the Styr 
River, while the Luftwaffe destroyed hundreds of enemy airplanes – most of them 
while stationed on the airfields – and strafed countless convoys. Soviet counterattacks 
in Rovno and Dubno failed due to incoordination. A political commissar shot himself, 
after leading the 8
th
 Mechanized Corps into a swamp.
61
 Kirponos decided to 
withdraw. On 29 June, the Germans took Lvov without a fight, but on 30, the 4
th
 
Mechanized Corps counterattacked to cover Kirponos' retreat.   
 In 2 July, von Rundsted pushed his troops to storm the Stalin Line
62
 before the 
Soviets assume defensive positions. However, Kirponos' men got there first. To the 
north, General Ewald von Kleist's (1881-1954) Panzergruppe I destroyed 1,200 
enemy vehicles in 10 days.
63
        
 The Stalin Line was incoherent with some of its points being immediately 
penetrated, while others offered resistance. By 9 July 1941, the 13
th
 and 14
th
 panzer 
divisions have reached Berdichev and captured Zhitomir respectively. The STAVKA 
(Soviet high-command) ordered Kirponos to attack Berdichev, and created a new 
command echelon, the "Strategic Direction", appointing Marshall Semyon Budyonny 
to oversee the actions in Ukraine, along with his Political Commissar Nikita 
Khrushchev (1894-1971).        
 Hitler and his generals quarreled about the next targeted. The Führer wanted to 
split the panzer spearheads, to simultaneously race and capture Kiev as well as 
encircling the enemy in Dnieper's bend. Von Rundstedt preferred Kiev to be captured 
by the infantry .         
 With the Germans closing to Zhitomir and converging to Kiev, Budyonny 
ordered a counterattack. Human-wave assaults resulted in extreme losses. But the 
Germans were hard-pressed too; the 11
th
 Panzer Division suffered 2,000 casualties in 
these battles alone. Von Kleist's panzers turned south to trap the enemy at Uman. 
Kirponos realized the maneuver, and withdrew from Vinnitsa. On 18 July, 
Gebirgsjäger troops with Sturmgeschütz ("assault gun") support captured an intact 
bridge over the Bug near Vinnitsa.
64
 The Germans tried to close the pocket, but the 
Soviet 6
th
 and 12
th
 armies slipped southeastwards. Hitler, obsessed with annihilating 
the enemy, stooped the advance towards Kiev ordering a new encirclement at Uman.
 Kirponos had mistakenly assumed that the German onslaught was blunted, 
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while STAVKA realized belatedly the actual enemy intentions. By 21 July, panzer 
forces reached Monastyrishche and pocketed the Soviet 6
th
 and 12
th
 armies. Further 
attempts to punch an escape route resulted in the partial encirclement of the Soviet 
18
th
 Army. On 3 August, the Germans link-up on a bridge at Pervomaysk, and started 
reducing the pocket mercilessly. On 9 August, 103,000 Soviet soldiers were captured, 
while 317 tanks and 1,095 guns were destroyed or taken.
65
 After Uman's debacle the 
Soviets evacuated Western Ukraine and Bessarabia.     
 A large salient was forming around Kiev as the panzers rolled across the 
Ukrainian plains. On 16 September, two panzer groups met at Kremenchug, sealing 
the pocket containing almost 50 Soviet divisions. 527,000 were captured and 150,000 
managed to escape.
66
 Kirponos was killed after stepping onto a mine, during a 
breakout attempt. Kiev was taken on 19 September.     
 By mid-October 1941, the Germans controlled the Donbass, and, on 25, they 
took Kharkov. On 21 November, the LSSAH Division
67
 entered in Rostov-on-Don, 
but was driven by a Soviet counterattack. On 16 October, the Romanians captured 
Odessa, and by December all Crimea – except Sevastopol – was in Axis hands.  
In the other sectors, Field-Marshall von Bock's Army Group Centre – from late June-
early October 1941 – managed to capture the astonishing number of 1,300,000 enemy 
prisoners along with thousands of tanks, and artillery pieces, in three spectacular 
encirclement battles: Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma-Bryansk.   
 Nevertheless, when Operation Typhoon – the final drive to Moscow – began, 
on October 2, the Wehrmacht had reached its limit. Many vehicles were lost, logistic 
lines were overstretched, and the coming of rasputitsa
68
 deteriorated the already 
primitive road network.       
 Despite the horrific losses, USSR's enormous manpower pool, and an 
excellent mobilization system, enabled the creation of a whole new Red Army. 
Moreover, Stalin was informed by his spy-network about Japanese intentions to attack 
the Americans, so he could utilize the 750,000 troops stationed in the Far East.  
 On 7 November, a preterm coming of the winter froze the ground, allowing 
mechanized movement. Stalin, undoubtedly to boost the morale, held the annual 
parade on the Red Square, to commemorate the Bolshevik Revolution. Afterwards, 
the parading troops went immediately to battle.     
 On 28 November 1941, elements of the 7
th
 Panzer Division crossed the 
Moscow-Volga canal and observed the Kremlin's spirals. It was the closest the 
Wehrmacht ever got to Moscow. On early December, the exhausted Nazi juggernaut 
stopped short of its target. Woefully unprepared for winter warfare, the Germans 
literally froze to a standstill. On 5 December, General Zhukov unleashed a powerful 
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counteroffensive. By January 1942, the Soviets succeeded in pushing back the enemy 
250 kilometers from Moscow, but Army Group Center withstood. 
Army Group North had – comparatively – the easier task. The road network was more 
extensive northern than southern of the Pripyat Marshes. By 26 June, General Erich 
von Manstein's (1887-1973) panzers established a bridgehead on River Dvina. On 8 
July, the Stalin Line was breached and the Germans were approaching Leningrad. The 
Baltic populations greeted the invaders as liberators, and local insurgents created 
havoc in Red Army's rear. Leningrad was first attacked in August. By early 
September, stiffening resistance and mounting losses, made Hitler to order the city's 
besiegement and blockading. It was the beginning of an 872 days purgatory for 
Leningrad's citizens that would claim 1,000,000 lives. 
By February 1942, both sides were totally exhausted and major operations would 
resume on May. Thus far, the Germans suffered almost 900,000 casualties. Soviet 
losses were astronomical, all the mechanized forces and 177 rifle divisions deployed 
in June 1941 were lost, plus 1,000,000 casualties in the battle for Moscow.
69
 
 Hitler's gamble to conquer USSR with one crushing blow has failed. But the 
war in Russia has just started and was about to reveal its horrendous face. 
 
THE "NEW ORDER" IN WESTERN UKRAINE 
When Operation Barbarossa got underway, the OUN-B initiated subversive actions 
against the Soviets. In remote areas, guerillas attacked the Soviet troops or took 
control of the police functions and dissolve the kolkhozes. However, in urban centers, 
Soviet retaliation was brutal. In Lvov, the NKVD executed 4,000 Ukrainian and 
Volksdeutsche
70
 political prisoners, while many more were deported eastward.
71
 All 
the administrative/party apparatus and a considerable number of Galician Jews fled to 
escape the Nazi onslaught. Throughout Western Ukraine, cheering crowds greeted the 
Germans as liberators, while destroying all symbols of Soviet statehood.  
 The Wehrmacht entered Lvov, on 30 June 1941, accompanied by the 
"Nachtigall" Battalion, and OUN-B cadres under Yaroslav Stetsko (1912-1986), a 
leading factional member and close associate of Bandera.    
 The Banderites decided to present the Germans with a fait accompli by 
unilaterally declaring the establishment of the Ukrainian state. Apart from informal 
assurances by individual Nazi officials, there was no formal commitment on the issue.
 In the "National Assembly" held on the meeting room of the Prosvita 
("enlightenment) society, on 30 June, at 20:00 p.m., Stetsko issued the Akt 
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vidnovlennia Ukrayinskoi Derzhany ("Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood"), 
declaring the Ukrainian state. It was hoped that Ukraine would attain a status similar 
to that of Slovakia or Croatia.
72
       
 This unilateral act needed further backing; although the relations of 
Metropolitan Sheptytsky with the OUN were stressed, his support was critically 
important. The "Nacthigall's" chaplain, managed to meet the bedridden metropolitan, 
and asked his blessing for the endeavor. Of course, he withheld the split inside the 
OUN, and that they acted without German consent. Apparently convinced, Sheptytsky 
wrote a pastoral letter, exhorting the people to support the new government, "We 
greet the victorious German Army as deliverer from the enemy. We render our 
obedient homage to the government has been erected. We recognize Mr. Yaroslav 
Stetsko as Head of the State Administration of the Ukraine;"
73
 Sheptytsky's letter was 
read over the radio. The aged Kost Levytsky was appointed president of the 
parliament (Council of Seniors). Although the wider Galician political spectrum was 
represented in the government, the OUN-B kept the key offices; Shukhevych became 
deputy war minister, Mykola Lebed (1909-1998) minister of security, and Ivan 
Klymiv minister of political coordination. 
Berlin was deeply disturbed. Three days after the proclamation, an Einsatzgruppe 
arrived in Lvov along with Ukrainian auxiliaries. On 9 July, Stetsko was placed under 
house arrest; Stepan Bandera – residing in Generalgouvernment territory – and his 
associates were arrested too, and assembled in Berlin for questioning. They were 
pressured to accept a status in Galicia similar to that of the Ukrainian Central 
Committee in Krakow. The OUN-B's leadership refused, but they were not 
imprisoned. Nominally under house arrest, they continued their activities.   
 In late June – undoubtedly with German consent – the pokhidny hrupy 
("march groups") were formed, comprised of young men and some women, in eastern 
Generalgouvernment, to spread the Banderite network to East and South Ukraine.  
 On 6 July 1941, Melnyk and a number of veteran officers addressed an appeal 
to Hitler, asking permission to establish a Ukrainian military formation that would 
participate in "the crusade against Bolshevik barbarism", "shoulder to shoulder with 
the legions of Europe" and with their "liberator, the German Wehrmacht".
74
 
 Although unimpressed, the Germans allowed Ukrainians – of former Soviet 
citizenship – to be recruited in OUN-M police units. Melnyk called all "nationalists" 
for unity, an end to factionalism, declaring his readiness to forget past enmities if all 
would return to his fold.       
After it became clear that Berlin did not supported Stetsko, OUN-B's power in Lvov 
collapsed. In late July, the Council of Seniors was expanded and renamed to National 
Council. The Germans lobbied the replacement of Banderites with Melnykites. The 
long association of OUN-M with the Germans, had secured them a large number of 
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posts as interpreters, advisers etc. in Wehrmacht units,
75
 something that 
accommodated their propaganda in East Ukraine. They were also reinforced with the 
arrival of 500 young Ukrainians, driven from Southern Bukovina after skirmishing 
with the Romanian gendarmerie. Ukrainians from Bukovina manned the OUN-M's 
auxiliary police in Galicia, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir and Kiev.    
 By late summer 1941, the OUN-M set up a quasi-administration in Zhitomir, 
their center outside Galicia. The Germans allowed the functioning of a variety of 
nationalist organizations – a pedagogical institute, high-schools, a theater, an 
orchestra, and a youth organization –76 as well as the reinstitution of private economy. 
Additionally, throughout occupied Ukraine, during the first few months of German 
rule, there were signs of a Ukrainian national(ist) rebirth in all aspects of life.
77
 
 In late August, Omelyan Senyk, Mykola Stsiborsky, and Oleh Kandyba 
"Olzych", leading members of the OUN-M, arrived in Zhitomir. On the evening of 30 
August, Senyk and Stsiborsky were shot by a young man. Senyk died instantly, while 
Stsiborsky passed out a few hours later.
78
 The German-Ukrainian police shot down 
the assassin as he tried to escape. All indications pointed out the OUN-B as the 
perpetrators. Although Melnyk publicly refused to countenance on reprisals, 
retaliation did occurred. OUN-B members were arrested in Zhitomir, and, in early 
September, the SS Einsatzgruppen arrested and executed most of the OUN-B task 
force in southern Ukraine and Crimea. In some cases, the Banderites were denounced 
by the OUN-M.         
 In 22 September 1941, OUN-M cadres arrived from Zhitomir in Kiev, to 
organize the administration. In early October, they formed a Ukrainian National 
Council in Kiev, headed by Professor Mykola Velychkivsky, intending to be the basis 
for a future Ukrainian government.
79
 However, the Germans included and the OUN-
M in the crackdown, probably aiming to remove the radical elements, before 
establishing a civil administration.       
 Eventually, the Germans divided occupied Ukraine into three administrative 
regions: the Generalgouvernement, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and the military 
zone. Galicia east of the San River, was incorporated to the Generalgouvernement on 
1 August 1941 as Distrikt Galizien governed by the German General-Governor Karl 
Lasch (1904-1942). The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was formed on 20 August 1941, 
and governed by Reichskommissar Erich Koch,
80
 having his seat in Rovno. 
As German occupation in Ukraine was consolidating, the Nazis began implementing 
their empire-building in the East. An orgy of violence begun, soon to reach 
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uncontrollable dimensions consuming millions of people in occupied territories, 
coming to be known as the Holocaust. 
Already by January 1941, the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (1900-1945) and his 
staff were drawing grotesque plans of demographic engineering for the East. The 
Generalplan Ost ("General plan for the East"), developed by Conrad Meyer, a 
university professor and Himmler's close associate, called for an area behind the line 
Leningrad-Lake Ladoga-Valdai Hills-Bryansk-Dnieper's bend, to be completely 
repopulated. 30,000,000 Slavs were to be exterminated, 14,000,000 to be deported, 
and 14,000,000 deemed racially "fit" to be Germanized.
81
 Additionally, huge numbers 
of slave laborers would be set to work on enormous construction projects. For the 
Generalgouvernement and Western Ukraine, 85% of the Poles, and 65% of the 
Ukrainians were to be deported to Siberia, to make room for German colonists.
82
 
The first incident of anti-Jewish violence in USSR occurred in Lvov. When the SS 
Wiking Division
83
 entered the city, on 30 June, it was engaged heavily with Soviet 
rearguards, losing one regimental commander. As a reprisal, the Waffen-SS troops, 
along with the 1
st
 Gebirgsjäger Division, shoot 60 Jews and committed other 
massacres during sweeping operations.
84
      
 Before fleeing, the Soviets have torched the prisons and the stench emanated 
from the corpses of those executed by the NKVD. The Germans ordered the Jews to 
retrieve the corpses and laid them out for public display.
85
    
 By May 1941, the OUN-B had its own plans of ethnic cleansing. On 30 June 
the Ukrainian militia was formed comprised of OUN members from Krakow and 
Lvov, and former Soviet Ukrainian militiamen; they immediately began arresting 
Jews. Lvov's mob took out their anger on them, allegedly, because Jews "had always 
collaborated with the Bolsheviks".
86
 In an orgy of violence, Jewish women and girls 
faced beating, humiliation and rape. Also Jews were drafted for labor, primarily 
including humiliating chores. On 1 July, the SS, Gestapo, and Ukrainian auxiliaries 
executed about 2,000.        
 After being subordinated to the SS on 2 July, the militia was disbanded on 13 
August, and replaced by the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police under direct German control. 
In all, the Lvov's pogrom of 30 June-3 July 1941, claimed 4,000 Jewish lives. Another 
13,000-35,000 were murdered throughout Western Ukraine.
87
   
 Metropolitan Sheptytsky downplayed anti-Jewish violence, emphasizing the 
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NKVD executions. He considered the pogroms a product of the wartime anomaly, 
perpetrated by social dregs. The pogrom of Rohatyn, on late March 1942, might have 
changed his viewpoint. Afterwards, Sheptytsky addressed sermons and pastoral letters 
to his clergymen and flock; he also sent letters to Pope Pius XII, two cardinals, and a 
written protest to Himmler.
88
 Additionally, he was engaged in saving Jews. 
Altogether, Sheptytsky saved 150 Jews, mostly children.
89
 Furthermore, he also 
helped them to obtain false papers to escape.   
By early July 1941, the Einsatzgruppen in Belorussia and Lithuania were executing 
Jews by the thousands. In Ukraine, apart from killing them, the Nazis intended to 
work Jews to the death in labor projects. Himmler and Heydrich paid visits to the field 
urging their subordinates to intensify the extermination of the "unfit". Field-Marshal 
von Reichenau, commander of the German 6
th
 Army, praised Otto Rasch, head of 
Einsatzgruppe C, for his valuable services and harmonious cooperation.   
 The best known mass execution carried by this Einsatzgruppe, took place on 
29-30 September at Babi Yar near Kiev, where 33,000 Jews of all ages were 
murdered.          
 In late May 1942, the gassings began at the concentrations camps of Chelmno, 
Belzec, and Sobibor, while they were about to begin in Auschwitz, and Treblinka. 
The Jews of Volhynia, instead of being gassed, they were executed near their homes. 
The liquidation of ghettos in 1942 was implemented by 1,400 Germans and about 
12,000 Ukrainian policemen. In all 150,000 Volhynian Jews were murdered. By late 
1942, from a pre-war population of 3,250,000, only 300,000 Jews were alive in 
Generalgouvernement. 
Colonization was a critical aspect of Nazi empire-building in the East.
 
The most 
important experiment of colonization took place near Zhitomir.  
  
 
In early October 1941, Himmler had pinpointed an area around a former 
Soviet airbase and built an elaborate SS-police compound. He named this place 
Hegewald ("game reserve"). On 16 September 1942, he announced to his 
subordinates, the establishment of a colony for 10,000 Volhynian Volksdeutsche, 
south of Zhitomir. After some "preparatory work" – the extermination of nearby 
Jewish and Roma communities, and the deportation of thousands of Ukrainians – a 
sufficient number of ethnic Germans arrived, and Hegewald was declared a 
Volksdeutsche district under the SS jurisdiction.
90
 SS specialists instructed the settlers 
on farming and various issues
.
 The increasing partisan activity caused the creation of 
Selbstschutz ("self-protection") units.       
 In March 1943 Hegewald's population peaked at 10,178 settlers, living in an 
area of 500 square kilometers.
91
 However, by November 1943 the Red Army reached 
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the area, prompting the evacuation of the colony.     
 In Poland, Volksdeutsche settled in pre-arranged areas after deporting or 
murdering the original inhabitants. In November 1942, the area of Zamosc, in 
southeast Poland, was deemed ready. Over 100,000 Poles were to be uprooted and 
sent to concentration camps for "selection". Those considered "racially fit" – mainly 
children – would be Germanized; the rest would either work as slave laborers or 
starved to death in "retirement villages".
92
 However, the Poles revolted and killed 
some of the Volksdeutsche settlers, while others joined the partisans. German 
reprisals were brutal but failed to quell the rebellion that continued until spring 1943. 
Local assistance was catalytic to the implementation of the Nazi new order. German 
manpower shortages necessitated an increased reliance on collaborators.   
 The Schutzmannschaften ("protection teams") – or Schuma – battalions were 
auxiliary police forces, designated to operate under the German military police 
(Gendarmerie) in cleansing operations. By December 1942 they numbered 200,000, 
reflecting the growing partisan activity. The personnel of Schutzmannaschaften were 
local volunteers and Soviet POWs. Adherents from both OUN factions served in these 
battalions; namely the 115, 118, and 201.      
 Nine-hundred Melnykites from Bukovina formed the "Bukovinian Battalion", 
a paramilitary formation that, in 18 August 1941, was merged with kindred elements 
from Carpatho-Ukraine into one unit of about 1,700 men. They have participated in 
the massacres at Babi Yar on late September. However, in the wider German 
crackdown against both OUN factions, the "Bukovinian Battalion" was dissolved. 
Nonetheless, many of its personnel were reorganized as Schutzmannschaft battalions 
115 and 118.
93
          
 The Schuma Battalion 115 was formed on the basis of the "Bukovinian 
Battalion" having 350 men by July 1942. Later on, Eastern Ukrainians, defectors and 
common criminals joined its ranks. The Battalion participated along various 
collaborationist and German formations in large-scale anti-partisan operation 
throughout Belorussian from December 1942-February 1944.
94
 It remained in 
Belorussia until July 1944, when it followed the retreating Germans into Poland. In 
East Prussia the battalions 115 and 118 were merged into the Ukrainian 
Schutzmannschaft Battalion 63, numbering 500-600 men. In August, it was 
reorganized as the 30.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (weißruthenische Nr. 1).  
 The Schuma Battalion 118 was formed in spring of 1942 based upon Battalion 
115, numbering 500 men. The Battalion arrived in Minsk, in November 1942. At this 
point Russians and Belorussians have joined the ranks, and it was commanded by 
General-Major Erich Körner and his staff. The Schuma Battalion 118, during March-
August 1943, participated in brutal "pacification" operations in Belorussia, 
collaborating with battalions 115, 102, the Ukrainian-Belorussian Battalion 101, the 
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Kaminsky Brigade,
95
 Hungarian and Belorussian formations, as well as the infamous 
SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger.
96
 It also fought against the Armia Krajowa 
(Polish Home Army).  
The "Nachtigall" Battalion, under Roman Shukhevych, murdered Jews around 
Vinnitsa on July 1941.
97
 However, Stetsko's abortive effort to establish a Ukrainian 
state caused the dissolution of "Nachtigall" on 13 August. Similarly, in 10 September, 
the "Roland" Battalion, attached to the 11
th
 German Army in Bessarabia, was 
excluded from continuing the campaign for "political reasons". The personnel from 
both units were transported to Neuhammer, Silesia.    
 There they were reorganized as 201 Scutzmannschaft Battalion, under Major 
Yevhen Pobihushchy and a German supervising officer. The battalion moved to 
Frankfurt-an-der-Oder on early October. Another 60 Soviet POWs from central 
Ukraine, handpicked by Shukhevych, were added to the battalion's strength. After 
training in Germany, the Schuma Battalion 201 was sent to northeastern Belorussia, 
on 16 March 1942 to "fight partisans and kill Jews".
98
    
 During the winter of 1941-1942, the Soviets have supplied and reinforced the 
local partisans behind Axis lines. Moreover, in August-October 1942, the partisans 
have repeatedly attacked the railways. However, the relations between the battalion 
and the German command were strained, following a decision to extend their term of 
service for an indefinite period, and due to mistreatment of the Ukrainians by German 
officers.         
 Around Christmas 1942, the SS General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski 
disbanded the battalion. On 6 January 1943, its personnel were sent to Lvov, and the 
officers were imprisoned. Some, including Shukhevych, managed to escape and went 
underground. In its 10-month tenure in Belorussia, the Schuma Battalion 201 suffered 
89 casualties of whom 49 killed, while it eliminated 2,000 "partisans". A 1:40 ratio of 
killed "bandits" clearly indicates mass murder of civilians, rather than conventional 
counterinsurgency.
99
 
 
THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY 
While the two OUN factions clashed, the UNR was largely shunned. Nevertheless the 
Petlyurists have formed an underground group before the war – the Ukrayinska 
Natsionalna Vidrodzhennia ("Ukrainian National Rebirth") – that went underground 
after the Soviet takeover. Taras "Bulba"-Borovets (1908-1981) a Ukrainian former 
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NCO in the Polish Army, and member of the UNR, consulted with Andrey Levytsky 
in Warsaw, for creating an insurgent organization.    
 Thus, the Poliska Sich ("Polesian Sich") came to being, based on Sarny, in 
Rovno oblast. In late June 1941, the Germans permitted the development of the 
Polesian Sich as a force to fight Volhynia's embryonic partisan formations.  
 In mid-August, after a meeting with Senyk and Stsiborsky in Lvov, Bulba-
Borovets obtained support and a cadre of officers from the OUN-M. Having its 
headquarters at Olevsk, and being equipped by the Germans, the Polesian Sich grew 
to a force of several thousand. After clearing the forests of Polesia and northern 
Volhynia from Soviet partisans, Bulba-Borovets' guerillas established an insurgent 
"state", known as the Olevsk Republic.
100
      
 However, on 15 November, the Germans ordered the dissolution of the Olevsk 
Republic and the Polesian Sich, to organize a civil administration. Bulba-Borovets' 
group was unable to resist, and was forced to demobilize. Nevertheless, Bulba-
Borovets and 100 of his men withdrew in the forests northeast of Rovno. For the most 
of 1942, they continued skirmishing with scattered partisans and collecting abandoned 
Soviet weapons. The Germans knew about it, but seemed indifferent, due to their 
insignificant size.         
 By summer 1942, some Melnykites wishing to avoid German punishment, 
seek the protection of the Polesian Sich. The Banderites, on the other, won the support 
of Leonidas Shcherbatiuk an assistant of Bulba-Borovets and of some local peasants. 
They established the socialist Ukrayinska Narodna Demokratychna Partiya 
("Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party" – UNDP).      
 Ideological orientation was rather uncertain. Although nominally loyal to the 
UNR, Bulba-Borovets had a discontinuous line of communication with Levytsky, and 
the latter could provide minimal assistance. Surprisingly, nonetheless, this tiny force 
was the only Ukrainian nationalist organization – for now – close to resemble a 
guerilla group.        
 Interestingly, in late summer, the re-emerging Soviet partisans of Polesia 
contacted the Polesian Sich to unite their efforts against the Germans, demanding its 
formal submission to Soviet control. Bulba-Borovets agreed only for a limited-scale 
common action. The local Red partisans were still weak and confined at Volhynia's 
northernmost edge, receiving support from the powerful Belorussian groups.
101
 
Eventually, the Soviet partisans lost their patience with Bulba-Borovets and moved 
against him. By autumn 1942, large numbers of partisans were parachuted to northern 
Volhynia or crossed the Pripyat marshes from, making the entire forest area west of 
the Dnieper their area of operations.  Additionally, the prominent partisan leader, 
Sidor Kovpak (1887-1967), had come to the area following Stalin's personal order. 
The Soviet dictator wanted to rally the scattered regional partisan forces to conduct a 
powerful raid west of the Dnieper, demonstrating to his former subjects USSR's 
power and German weakness.       
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 By 10 November 1942, Kovpak's force entered the territory of 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine, passing above the confluence of the rivers Pripyat and 
Dnieper.
102
 However, the Germans unleashed vicious counterattacks and the Soviet 
partisans spent two months evading them in frozen swamps along the middle course 
of the Pripyat.         
 Meanwhile the Ukrainian nationalists gathered strength, although they yielded 
some ground to northeastern Volhynia. The German harsh countermeasures, 
generated fears in the OUN-B that the police units it dominated – and were breaking 
up – might join the Communists. Thus, they decided to begin their own insurgency in 
November 1942. The two major centers of OUN-B activity were an area around 
Kovel-Volodymyrets-Kostopol-Lutsk in western Volhynia, and a place southwest of 
Rovno. However, the activity here was limited due to unfavorable terrain.  
 The OUN-B insurgency's nucleus was a group of 100 men under a leader with 
the pseudonym "Kruk". Nearby there was an OUN-M group under the command of an 
officer known as "Khrin".
103
 Nevertheless, both were in fact undergrounds rather than 
partisan bands. It appears that they strove to maintain a semblance of subordination to 
German orders, and avoid their hostility. The surrounding peasant population was 
largely sympathetic to the nationalist cause enabling the insurgents to establish a 
natural link between Galicia's headquarters and the battle-zones to the north. 
 There were also, small pro-Melnykite bands cooperating with a group of 
OUN-B dissidents known as the Front Ukrayinskykh Revolutsionistsiv ("Front of 
Ukrainian Revolutionaries") operating in the woods near Dubno, Lutsk, and 
Volodymyr-Volynsky; and a group of Free Cossacks under "hetman" Voloshyn-
Berchak in the Kremenets region. The Polesian Sich continued to grow as fugitives 
and policemen unaffiliated with OUN-B were seeking a haven.   
 To gather the dispersed insurgents, Bulba-Borovets proposed a single 
command, and the OUN-B sent negotiators. Both sides agreed for a unified command, 
but Bulba-Borovets wanted to form an all-party front (UNDP, UNR, OUN-M, and 
OUN-B). The OUN-B agreed to recognize Bulba-Borovets as overall commander, but 
demanded to have the political direction. They argued that the UNR leadership in 
Warsaw was unable to command effectively a shifting insurgent force like. 
 Further differences regarding ideology brought the collapse of negotiations on 
May 1943.
104
 By that time, large Soviet partisan groups arrived in western Volhynia. 
The whole area north of the Zhitomir-Kiev line would never return under effective 
German control.        
 Moscow ordered Kovpak to conduct an extensive operation deep into Galicia. 
The shortest route lied directly across western Polesia and Volhynia. Passing through 
the heart of Bulba-Borovets' territory in Liudvipol and then traversing the Tsuman 
area dominated by the Banderites; Kovpak's force entered Galicia from south of 
Tarnopol. The entire march – over 402 kilometers – took about three weeks. 
 However, the partisan offensive in Galicia, in July 1943, was only partially 
                                                          
102
 Ibid., p.146 
103
 Ibid., pp.148-9 
104
 Ibid., pp.150-1 
 33 
 
successful in its primary objective: to disrupt the oil production in Drohobych. The 
Communist guerillas and the OUN-B insurgents fought savagely; then, the Germans 
joined the fray. The partisan forces quickly disintegrated in the unfavorable 
environment. After the abortive raid on Drohobych, the partisans headed for the 
Caprathians. In late August, Kovpak himself, with a part of his band, headed north 
reaching the swamps of Polesia on 1 September with about 300 men. His deputy, 
Semyon Rudnev, stayed behind and was killed along the majority of his group. A 
decisive factor in the routing of the Red partisans was the Galician population's 
hostility.
105
          
 Meanwhile, the Banderites began seizing control of the nationalist insurgency. 
After the collapse of negotiations with Bulba-Borovets, Dmytro Kliachkevsky (1911-
1952) was induced to adopt the title Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya ("Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army" – UPA). Additionally, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the 
OUN – held in August 1943 - appointed Roman Shukhevych, who has escaped from 
the German prison in Lvov, Commander-in-Chief of the UPA. Moreover, the OUN-B 
leadership decided to settle its scores with Bulba-Borovets and the Melnykites. 
 Subsequently, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the 
"Khrin" detachment, demanding their submission to OUN-B command.
106
 The 
majority of the OUN-M group accepted the ultimatum and was incorporated to the 
UPA. Similarly, other Melnykite groups were compelled to join them. Anything that 
remained outside this framework was destroyed either by the OUN-B or the Soviet 
partisans.          
 In mid-August 1943, the Polesian Sich – already seriously weakened by the 
fight with the Soviet partisans – was attacked by the Banderites. Two of his chief 
advisers were captured and forced to join the UPA; also his wife was taken prisoner 
and later murdered. Bulba-Borovets along with a handful of stragglers were driven 
eastwards. In November they engaged with a stronger partisan band, and two of 
Bulba-Borovets' associates were killed; nonetheless, he managed to escape. After 
leaving a small cadre in Volhynia – renamed to Ukrayinska Narodna Revoliutsiina 
Armiya ("Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army" – UNRA) to distinct itself from 
the UPA – Bulba-Borovets went to Warsaw, seeking German assistance to rebuild 
their scattered force.
107
        
 By autumn 1943, UPA's ruthlessness and its rivals' hesitation brought 
Volhynia and southwestern Polesia under the OUN-B control. In fact, they controlled 
such large an area east of Rovno, that they established a "state" apparatus, including 
military training camps, hospitals and a school system.
108
    
 The UPA was expanded through forced draft and the terror of the dreaded 
underground intelligence service Sluzhba Bezpeki OUN (SB-OUN), headed by 
Mykola Lebed. According to a Soviet report, 40% of the UPA's fighters are 
volunteers, while the rest were forcibly drafted. In reality, in Rovno oblast the 
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personnel were recruited under threats of physical extermination.
109
  
 A German estimate of late 1943 mentions 40,000 people as involved to the 
endeavor. Apart from Ukrainians, there were deserters from German police units, 
POWs from various Soviet ethnicities, and a handful of Jews.   
 There were cases of individuals Jews who were recruited by the UPA and, 
thus, survived the Holocaust. However this favor was done by necessity. The 
extermination of Jews removed from the region a variety of professions: doctors, 
cobblers, tanners, smiths etc., in which they were prominent. The UPA needed 
desperate physicians and nurses. There were even cases where the Banderites stole 
Jewish doctors and their families out of the ghettos.
110
 By the spring of 1943, the 
insurgency began to single-out skilled Jewish professionals to work their trades in 
UPA's special concentration camps. For example, in April 1943, such a camp was 
established near Poryck, of Volhynia, containing more than 100 Jews.
111
 However, 
there were also cases where UPA guerillas lured Jews from their hideouts, supposedly 
to recruit them, but eventually killed them.       
 It is estimated that from a pre-war population of 200,000 Volhynian Jews, 
150,000 perished during the ghettos' liquidation, 46,000 were murdered by the 
Ukrainians or died from hardships, and just 3,500 survived the war.
112
 
The UPA leadership – consisted of ruthless OUN-B activists – was deeply involved in 
the Holocaust. Although Bulba-Borovets and his group had carried out pogroms 
against the local Jews, they rejected the Banderite fanaticism.  
 Many members of the UPA were former policemen, Hilfsfreiwillige,
113
 and 
have manned the Schuma battalions, who had been instrumental in implementing the 
Holocaust in Ukraine and Belorussia.      
 By the winter 1942-1943 the various nationalist guerilla groups began a 
murderous campaign against all non-Ukrainians. Jews who escaped from the ghettos 
were seized on highways, in villages, or in the woods, and were killed.   
 In March-April 1943, Lebed imposed a collective death sentence on the Poles 
of Western Ukraine, sending to a horrified Bulba-Borovets a list of demands 
including wide cleansing operations. The "mass extermination" was organized by 
Kliachkevsky.          
 Bands of the UPA roamed the Polish settlements in Volhynia starting an orgy 
of violence. The murderers used primarily farm tools – pitchforks, scythes, and 
knives. The victims' corpses were often brutally mutilated. Dismembered, crucified, 
or disemboweled bodies were displayed in order to instill terror and force the 
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Volhynian Poles to flee. Eyewitness testimonies describe the UPA guerillas passing 
through a Polish settlement in the vicinity of Volodymyr-Volynsky singing: "We 
slaughtered the Jews, we'll slaughter the Poles, old and young, everyone; we'll 
slaughter the Poles, we'll build Ukraine". Also, bodies of Poles were floating down 
the River Bug.
114
         
 It is estimated that during UPA's genocidal campaign from March 1943-late 
1944, around 88,700 Poles were murdered.
115
 
By 1943, German defeats prompted the OUN-B to re-orientate itself towards the 
West. In the Third Extraordinary Congress of August, the extreme racism was toned 
down and official OUN-UPA statements were tempered with democratic and 
inclusive rhetoric. Nevertheless, Volhynia's genocidal campaign continued unabated. 
 Red Army's advance into Volhynia, by February 1944, highlighted UPA's 
weaknesses – especially its lack of trained military personnel of all ranks that reduced 
its fighting value. Since the erstwhile mighty Wehrmacht was being crushed and 
driven, the UPA was hopelessly unable to stand against the Soviet juggernaut. 
However, on 28 February, the guerillas succeeded in ambushing and mortally 
wounding Soviet Marshall Nikolai Vatutin – commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front – 
in Khmelnytsky oblast. He died from his wounds 6 weeks later in a hospital in Kiev.  
 Nevertheless, Vatutin's death was a purely symbolic victory for the UPA. In 
all engagements with the Red Army or the NKVD, the insurgents were crushed; thus, 
they went underground. On OUN's initiative, by 5 March 1944, the Ukrainian 
insurgents resumed negotiations with the Germans for combined actions against their 
common enemies. Cooperation was formally re-established in May. 
 
THE SS-GALIZIEN DIVISION 
By 1943, the tide of the war has turned against Nazi Germany. In February, 91,000 
pitiful survivors of the German 6
th
 Army surrendered to the Soviets in Stalingrad. In 
May, the North African campaign was over and 250,000 German-Italian troops 
surrendered to the Allies in Tunisia. German irrecoverable losses from September 
1939-May 1943 amounted to 1,300,000 men.     
 The fading prospect of victory coupled with ominous shortages in manpower, 
prompted Berlin to reconsider a more concrete commitment by its foreign 
collaborators. From Hitler's principle that "only Germans may bear arms" early in the 
war, the Wehrmacht authorized a massive influx of non-German recruits. By early 
1944, there were Indian, Arabian, Turkic and Caucasian legions serving in the Heer. 
 In the Waffen-SS, besides the racially "desirable" Western European and 
Scandinavian volunteers, Himmler started recruiting Slavs, Baltics, Muslim-Bosnians, 
Albanians and other "untermenschen" to his "Aryan" fighting elite. The strict 
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enlistment criteria of the 1930s – certain physical features, verified "unstained" 
Germanic ancestry, and political reliability – were lowered to just being able to fire a 
rifle. By 1945, 38 Waffen-SS divisions were created, with 60% of their personnel 
being non-German. Hitler's Wehrmacht became one of the most multi-ethnic armies 
in history.    
In Berlin, on early March 1943, Galicia's new General-Governor, Otto Wächter 
(1901-1949), proposed to Himmler the establishment of a Ukrainian Waffen-SS 
division. After discussing with Hitler, Himmler responded to Wächter on 28 March, 
approving the plan. He preconditioned, that the division would be recruited, financed, 
and – to a degree – equipped by the Galicians themselves. For obvious political 
reasons, it would be titled "Galician" rather than "Ukrainian".
116
   
 The Ukrainian Central Committee and the Greek-Catholic Church were 
instrumental in the Division's formation. Support also came from the UNR in 
Warsaw.          
 Metropolitan Sheptytsky had lobbied the Germans early on to form a 
Ukrainian unit to fight the Soviets. Seeing the probability of Germany's defeat, he 
feared that the Bolsheviks would re-occupy Galicia. Wächter wrote that the 
metropolitan and his clergy were very helpful, had supported the Waffen-SS division, 
and prayed for the Führer in the liturgy.117 Keeping the young Galicians out of the 
UPA appears to have been one of the reasons why Sheptytsky supported the endeavor. 
Volodymyr Kubiyovych, on his part, stated that he was ready to take up arms for the 
Waffen-SS.
118
          
 However, both the Ukrainian Central Committed and the Greek-Catholic 
Church set two prerequisites: that the Division would fight only against Communist 
forces on the Eastern Front, and would receive its own Greek-Catholic chaplains, 
something unprecedented for a Waffen-SS unit.     
 On Wednesday, 28 April 1943, in Lvov, Wächter made the official 
proclamation, appealing the Galician youth to enlist into the Division to fight 
Communism and defend their families, their homeland, and Europe. On 6 May, 
Kubiyovych addressed the Galician youth stressing that the "historic opportunity" had 
come for the Ukrainian people to "do battle against its most grievous foe – 
Bolshevism", and they should stand "shoulder to shoulder with the invincible German 
army and destroy, once and for all, the Bolshevik beast." He emphasized the dilemma 
"Now or never!" urging them to join the ranks of the SS-Riflemen Division 
"Halychyna".
119
 
The OUN-B had an ambiguous stance; although it initially denounced the venture 
calling it "a typical colonial involvement" and that Ukrainians would be used as "a 
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cannon fodder",
120
 many Banderites served or cooperated with the SS-Galizien. 
 The OUN-M expressed its support considering it as the potential nucleus of a 
future Ukrainian national army. Roman Shukhevych and his UPA initially 
discouraged Galicia's youth from entering the Division calling them to "flee into the 
forests!" and join UPA's ranks. Nonetheless, Shukhevych, after contacting with 
Roman Krokhmaliuk, a member of the Galician Military Board, he calculated that he 
could send to the Division his own men as volunteers to receive a first-rate military 
training, and then desert back to the ranks of the UPA as organized cadres.
121
 
Eventually, the UPA and the Waffen-SS would work together in cleansing operations. 
Wächter's fears of a fiasco regarding the number of volunteers were disproved, and 
there was a variety of reasons. The need for a Galician division confirmed to the 
Ukrainians that Germany was losing the war, and the hated Soviets were advancing. 
German defeat meant Soviet reoccupation; thus, neutrality was not an option. The 
alternative of UPA was unappealing due to the subsequent hardships, and also 
because the insurgency was hopelessly impotent against Stalin's armada. Some joined 
viewing the Division as a herald of Ukrainian independence, some for adventure, 
while others because they were German sympathizers.    
 During the first month of recruitment over 80,000 Ukrainians volunteered for 
duty. 30,000 were rejected for political unreliability, and 20,000 as physically unfit. 
Ultimately 13-14,000 were accepted. Many volunteers were recruited from 
collaborationist formations.
122
       
 Propaganda was crucial in attracting volunteers. They were part of an elite that 
would fight a "deadly danger" which threaten them "from the Asiatic steppes". They 
defended the "traditions of Galician Ukrainianhood" and the "honorable and beautiful 
part of the world" called Europe.
123
 
Despite the heavy indoctrination of Ukrainian nationalists to the literature of 
Hrushevsky and Dontsov that they were "pure" Slavs destined to fight against the 
"Muscovite-Tatar" hordes and their "Jewish-Bolshevik" masters, the majority of the 
SS leadership lumped together the Ukrainians with the rest of the Slavic "sub-
humans". Many high-ranking Nazis found unacceptable the fact that a Waffen-SS 
formation would be comprised by racially "inferior" troops. SS General Kurt Daluege, 
voiced his fears that the weapons given by the Germans will eventually be used 
against them, citing the Ukrainian treachery of 1917-1918.    
 Reichskommissar Koch madly opposed the endeavor, fearing that this may 
herald a new German policy towards Ukraine.
124
 
The official establishment of the Division on 18 July 1943 saw much jubilation. An 
outdoor mass was held, attended by 50,000 people to bid farewell to the first group of 
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departing volunteers. Kost Pankivsky joined Wächter and Alfred Bisanz – liaison of 
Ukrainian question in the Generalgouvernement – in addressing the local SS 
leadership, the SS volunteers and enthusiastic young men in the blue uniforms of the 
nationalist scout organization Plast, which provided many of the volunteers to 
become officers of the division.
125
 On 20 July, the first transports set out to 
Heidelager, a military training ground in Generalgouvernment. 
The training was the typical of German infantry divisions. As an integral part of the 
training, the Galicians received two hours of education in National Socialist 
Weltanschauung every week. The units were trained in facilities linked to 
concentration camps. Like the Verwaltungsschule in Dachau, both the Heidelager and 
Hradischko training grounds were constructed as adjacent to forced labor camps. The 
Galicians occasionally interfered in the running of the Heidelager camp.
126
  
 On 29 August, at Heidelager, after the completion of the military and 
ideological training, the recruits were sworn the oath to Hitler in the presence of Otto 
Wächter and representatives of the Ukrainian Central Committee. By late September 
1943, the Division's headquarters staff was established commanded by SS General-
Major Walter Schimana. In October, the division was re-designated as the 
14.Galizische SS-Freiwilligen Division. On 31 December 1943, the strength of the 
Division consisted of 256 officers, 449 NCOs, and 11,929 enlisted men.
127
 
The divisional leadership could not be provided by the Ukrainians, for most of the 
volunteers had no prior military experience. Those drafted by the Red Army in 1939-
41 served mostly as labor troops, while those who had served in the Polish army 
before 1939 were of questionable quality because of Poland's outdated military 
system.          
 Thus, Germans would provide the necessary personnel. On 20 November 
1943, SS Brigadier-General Fritz Freitag (1894-1945) became the new divisional 
commander. Among the commanding officers was also SS-Captain Heinrich Wiens, a 
Ukrainian Volksdeutsche, who had served with Einsatzgruppe D, and participated in 
mass executions. On 2 March 1944, SS Lieutenant-Colonel, Franz Magall was 
appointed chief supply officer of the SS-Galizien Divisionl. He had been involved in 
atrocities in Belorussia at the beginning of the war and also served with the dreaded 
SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger. Both formations exchanged officers.
128
 
 There were also 10 officers and NCOs from "Nachtigall" and 4 from "Roland" 
battalions. Furthermore, some had served in the infamous Schutzmannschaften 
battalions; namely the 201, 204, and 206. The three battalions were involved either in 
atrocities against "Jews and Communists", or provided guards for the Pustkow 
concentration camp.
129
 Himmler had ordered the establishment of 5 Polizei Schützen 
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regiments, consisted of volunteers that had not made the first cut. They were 
integrated into the Division later. 
During the mass murder of the Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia by the UPA, the 
Polish village of Huta Pienacka became a refuge for Polish and Jewish survivors from 
surrounding settlements. The cooperation of Huta Pieanacka with Communist 
partisans sealed its fate.        
 Early in the morning of 28 February 1944, white-clad Waffen-SS soldiers 
surrounded the village and shelled it with artillery. Some of the Galicians entered the 
village and murdered the civilians – mostly women and children – either simply 
shooting them or locking them in barns that were torched.
130
 In 4 March 1944, after 
the killing of 15 Ukrainians in the village of Zhukiv by Polish insurgents, detachments 
of German gendarmerie, the UPA and men from the SS-Galizien Division conducted 
"pacification" assaults on nearby Polish villages.
131
 On 7 April, SS Ukrainians or 
"deserters from the unit" murdered 22 people in the Polish village of Chatki. On 17 
May 1944, Armia Krajowa reported to the Polish government-in-exile in London that 
"units of the SS Halychyna Division appeared recently in the country of Hrubieszow 
where they stepped up terrorist attacks on the civilian population. Six Polish villages 
were burned down." Furthermore, according to Dieter Pohl (Holocaust in Galicia), 
there is a "high probability" that Ukrainian Waffen-SS soldiers participated in the 
round-up of Jews in Brody on February 1944.
132
 
The Division participated in anti-partisan operations. In mid-February 1944, as a 
result of intense partisan activity, the division received orders to form a kampfgruppe 
("battlegroup") and be subordinated to the SS police of Generalgouvernement. On 15 
February, SS Colonel Friedrich Beyersdorff led a 2,000 strong battlegroup. 
 Kampfgruppe "Beyersdorff" operated in the regions of Podlachia, Polesia, and 
Volhynia. The battlegroup was divided into two subgroups – "A" and "B", and the 
planned assembly area was near Lubaczow, a Polish border town between Przemysl 
and Zamosc. However, sizeable elements of the kampfgruppe were sent to Lvov. 
After a brief stay, they rejoined the main bulk.     
 The stance of local population towards the Galician Waffen-SS was mixed. 
Ukrainians looked upon them as saviors, while the Poles viewed them with suspicion. 
The first encounter with Soviet partisans took place in a forest near the town of 
Frampol. After an initial surprise, the kampfgruppe counterattacked with artillery and 
cleared the area. 25 Galicians were lying dead. Some desertions were recorded, and 
most of them joined the UPA.       
 On 27 March 1944, Kampfgruppe "Beyersdorff" ceased its operations, and 
several days later, it rejoined the rest of Division in Neuhammer, Silesia. By this time 
the SS-Galizien boasted 12,901 soldiers. 
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CHAPTER THREE: UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM FIGHTS 
TO SURVIVE, 1944-1945 
 
THE BATTLE FOR WESTERN UKRAINE – KAMENETS-PODOLSK, 
TARNOPOL, KOVEL, BRODY 
After the battle of Kursk in July 1943, the Red Army held its momentum until the end 
of the war. Army Group South withdrew to the Dnieper and Hitler ordered its 
transformation into an impenetrable barrier.      
 While retreating, the Germans applied a scorched-earth policy. All kind of 
infrastructure was blown up; villages were burned down and their inhabitants 
executed or deported. In August, the SS-Sonderkommando 1005 returned to Babi Yar 
to destroy evidence of the mass murder before the Soviets arrive.   
 By November 1943, the Red Army overcame German resistance, liberating 
Kiev on 6 November, while Dnieper's defensive line was largely overran. 
 General Nikolai Vatutin's (1901-1944) 1
st
 Ukrainian Front advanced and took 
Zhitomir and Korosten; however, Field-Marshall Erich von Manstein's 48
th
 
Panzerkorps counterattacked in mid-November, temporarily recapturing them. In 
early December, General Ivan Konev's (1897-1973) 2
nd
 Ukrainian Front, breached 
the enemy line and liberated Cherkassy. On the same area, in February 1944, around 
60,000 German troops – among them foreign Waffen-SS volunteers and Hiwis – were 
encircled.          
 On 17 February, the encircled forces formed two columns, attempting to cross 
the River Gniloy Tikich, and reach an approaching panzer relief force. Meanwhile, 
the Soviets were ruthlessly hammering them. Less than half managed to escape. 
Among the fallen, was their commander General Wilhelm Stemmermann. Konev was 
promoted to Marshall of the Soviet Union.
133
 
By the beginning of 1944, the Axis fielded in the East, 2,500,000 troops, 1,500 
armored vehicles, and 2,000 airplanes against Red Army's 6,000,000 troops, 5,600 
armored vehicles, and 13,000 airplanes. Weakened by heavy losses in men and 
materiel the Axis was gradually driven westwards. Soviet losses were atrocious but 
USSR's reserves, resources, and infrastructure enabled her to outnumber, and out-
produce the Third Reich.        
Konev celebrated his promotion by resuming the offensive. The appalling weather 
conditions were an interchange of freeze and thaw, in what the Soviet soldiers 
described as the "mud offensive". The roads were rendered to knee-deep quagmires, 
limiting mechanized movement to a crawl.       
 The 2
nd
 Ukrainian Front pushed back the German 8
th
 Army continuing its 
advance to the Bug. By March, Konev's troops had entered Romania. 
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 After Vatutin's death, Marshall Georgy Zhukov assumed command of the 1
st
 
Ukrainian Front. He unleashed an attack on 4-5 March, and his tanks covered more 
than 160 kilometers, in a few days, trapping 22 understrength German divisions – 
about 200,000 men belonging to the 1
st
 Panzer Army – in a huge kessel ("cauldron" in 
German) near Kamenets-Podolsk. The pocket included elite German units like the SS-
Panzer divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich. However, the panzer forces were 
shadows of their old selves, able to muster some dozens of operational vehicles. The 
commander of the 1
st
 Panzer Army, Colonel-General Hans Hube – a survivor of 
Stalingrad – assumed the kessel's leadership. Hube and von Manstein were 
determined to save their troops. They refused to obey Hitler's orders of declaring the 
pocket a "fortress" that had to be defended to the last. Hube's kessel would be a 
"mobile pocket", to prevent the Soviets from cornering it and concentrating their 
forces to reduce it.         
 For more than two weeks, Hube maneuvered his troops moving southwards 
and then westwards, keeping the enemy guessing about their exact location.
134
 The 
Luftwaffe concentrated its remaining strength in the East, and did its best to support 
the operation. It managed to deliver 200-250 tons of supplies per day.
135
  
 The obvious escape route was to the south, where a number of bridges over 
the Dniester into Romania, remained open. Hence, Zhukov concentrated the bulk of 
his armor against these crossings. Von Manstein drew a plan for Hube's troops to 
attack directly westwards, breaking through the enemy lines and link up with a relief 
force moving east.         
 Hitler despised the plan because it gave up too much territory, and for days he 
lingered refusing to take a decision. On 24 March, after von Manstein's threat to issue 
orders himself, the Führer authorized the breakout. German reinforcements had 
arrived from France, in the form of the II SS-Panzerkorps, under SS Colonel-General 
Wilhelm Bittrich with the well-equipped – but untried – SS-Panzer divisions 
Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg. This formation would play decisive role in punching a 
corridor through from the west and take pressure off Hube's troops.  
 On 2 April, Zhukov issued two succinct ultimatums to the encircled Germans: 
if they did not immediately surrender 1/3 of those eventually captured will be shot, 
and, all officers who will not immediately surrender will be executed on capture. 
 By 3 April, Bittrich's forces had been assembled in Lvov, and the following 
day they went to action. The Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 with its Tiger tanks 
became the spearhead, battering its way through a large Soviet anti-tank front. Then, 
the Frundsberg Division took over the advance for the final 32 kilometers to the 
pocket. However, it immediately ran into a concealed enemy anti-tank front. The 
panzer went on to blast the Soviet defenses. Soon the vehicles were again rolling 
eastward. The Waffen-SS managed to link with the depleted 6
th
 Panzer Division, but 
they were soon cut-off by massive Soviet infantry attacks. Fierce fighting ensued in 
the snowy Galician woods along the columns' retreat route.    
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 On 6 April, Bittrich's men had flashed out the enemy infantry from the forest 
around Buchach, which was the objective of Hube's columns.    
 By 9 April 1944, all the trapped forces were safely out. Given the desperate 
German situation in USSR, it was a major success. Nevertheless, Hitler saw it 
differently. Field-Marshall von Manstein, "the savior of the Eastern Front", was 
relieved and replaced by Field-Marshall Walther Model – an ardent Nazi and fanatical 
supporter of Hitler – known for his "fight to the last bullet" attitude.  
On 4 March 1944, the 1
st
 Ukrainian Front advanced west of Shepetovka, breaching 
the 4
th
 Panzer Army's front. Near Yampol, the Soviet advance created a 40-kilometer-
wide breakthrough, threatening to cut-off the last major railroad east of the 
Carpathians close to Tarnopol. That would force the Germans to supply army groups 
Center and South via a long route through Romania.
136
    
 Tarnopol was designated a garrison-city, yet it lacked any actual fortifications. 
By 8 March 1944, Hitler ordered Tarnopol to be held to the last man, issuing the 
Führer Directive No. 11, in which he coined the term Fester-Platz ("fortified-place"). 
"Fortified-places" would be established in critical points of the front, allowing to be 
encircled, and hamper the Soviet advance.     
 After encircling Tarnopol from the east, the Soviets broke into the city at dawn 
of 9 March. Many rear-echelon units and civilians fled disorderly westwards to 
escape. The garrison defended doggedly, and, by 11 March, the first Soviet probe was 
eliminated.          
 The understrength garrison – about 4,600 men – consisted of local Galician 
militiamen, troops of the 8
th
 Panzer Division, and the 4
th
 SS-Freiwilligen Regiment 
from the SS-Galizien Division. There were also a few armored vehicles and some 
dozens of various artillery pieces.       
 By 23 March, Tarnopol was completely cut-off. The garrison's commander, 
General-Major Egon von Neindorff, knew that his forces were inadequate for a 
protracted siege. They prepared the defenses, distributed rations and ammunitions, 
and set assembly points for the wounded. Contact with the "outside" was possible 
only through radio.         
 On 24 March, the Soviets launched repeated attacks in the west against the 
Kutkowce and Zagrobela suburbs. The former was lost, while the latter changed 
hands several times. By nightfall it remained in German hands.   
 For the first time, a Soviet emissary proposed surrender terms for the garrison, 
but the offer was rejected.        
 On early morning 25 March, a convoy carrying 40 tons set off from Lvov to 
resupply the garrison. A kampfgruppe from the 8
th
 Panzer Division would accompany 
it, tasked with penetrating the enemy line, to create a safe passage.   
 The muddy road and Soviet resistance claimed many vehicles. When the 
kampfgruppe reached the final – and strongest – enemy positions, Soviet soldiers 
emerged from the woods, while tanks and anti-tank guns fired from concealed 
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positions. Soviet airplanes strafed the Germans killing nearly all the commanders of a 
panzergrenadier regiment, while destroying their radio station. The kampfgruppe's 
commander, Colonel Friebe ordered a withdrawal. German command promised to 
supply Tarnopol by air. Since there was no available airfield, the Luftwaffe could 
only drop supplies; however, due to enemy air defenses most airdrops landed on 
enemy-held territory, lakes or swamps.      
 On the evening of 25 March, an overwhelming Soviet offensive crushed the 
German positions at Zagrobela suburb. The besiegers also employed psychological 
warfare on the enemy: a group of 32 German prisoners were sent back with flyers 
exhorting the defenders to desert, while new ultimatums were delivered.
137
 
 On 28, after a two-hour artillery preparation, a Soviet rifle division, with tank 
and air support, stormed the southeast defenses. After bitter fighting, the Soviets 
decimated the defenders.        
 Hitler rejected von Neindorff's desperate requests for a breakout attempt, 
insisting that Tarnopol should be held until contact with German forces was restored.
 After pushing back the front to the city limits from all sides, the Soviets tried 
splitting the defensive zone within Tarnopol. The east and southeast defensive wings 
were driven, forcing the Germans withdrawing to a new line. A Soviet thrust to the 
city center was repulsed using the last German reserves.     
 On 5 April, Tarnopol was showered with artillery fire and airplane bombs; 
then, the Soviet infantry advanced. The Germans barricaded themselves in every 
standing building, setting anti-tank and machine-gun nests. Red Army soldiers 
charged shouting, moving through the debris; many of them were mowed by enemy 
fire. Yet they kept coming, trying to flush out the defenders with incendiary grenades 
and flamethrowers.
138
 Eventually, the Germans withstood suffering heavy losses.  
 In 10 April, von Neindorff informed his superiors that he lost 1,487 casualties 
and the garrison was about to collapse. They replied that a relief attack will begin on 
11 Apil, and the garrison should prepare for a breakout. The 48
th
 Panzerkorps would 
advance on 11 April through the main line of resistance in the Horosdyczcze-Kozlov 
sector. The 10
th
 SS-Panzer Division Hohensfaufen and the Panzerverband Friebe, 
would force crossings on the Stypa and Wosuszka rivers, and drive through Tarnopol 
by the shortest route while protecting the flanks.     
 Meanwhile, in Tarnopol, the final battle had begun. The Soviets determined to 
take the city, attacked ferociously on 11-12 April, achieving several penetrations into 
the enemy defenses; on 13 April, the pocket was split in two.   
 On 14 April, after three days of struggle against poor weather and stiff enemy 
resistance to establish the necessary bridgeheads, the relief attack advanced after a 
considerable improve in the weather. In the afternoon the panzer spearhead reached 
the Chodaczkow Wielki area, where it was halted by determined enemy resistance. 
Resuming the attack next morning, the relief force reached 11 kilometers from 
Tarnopol. They would advance no further; powerful Soviet defenses halted them for 
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good.          
 Then something unexpected happened: numbers of shabby men, barely 
recognizable as German soldiers, appeared before the panzers. They were the first 
men from Tarnopol. Thirty-three more reached them – then no other came. 
 At noon on 15 April, the last radio message from Zagrobela pocket reported 
that General-Major von Neindorff was killed in close-quarter fighting. Only 55 men 
from the 4,600 reached the German lines. 
German attention now, focused on the city of Kovel in Volhynia. A key rail and road 
junction, situated some 250 kilometers from Warsaw, east of Bug River. As a result of 
the heavy fighting in central and north Ukraine during the winter 1943-1944, a gap 
has been created between army groups Center and South.     
 In this gap, only Kovel remained in German hands, nominally under the 
command of SS General Otto Gille and his 5
th
 SS-Panzer Division Wiking. The 
Division itself was not in the city, however. There were some German replacement 
units and the weak 7
th
 Hungarian Infantry Division, which were to protect the 
Smolensk-Kovel railroad.
139
        
 Elements of the Hungarian Division were on both sides of the railroad Chelm-
Kovel. As the Soviets pushed forward, these units withdrew westward and lost much 
ground. A considerably weakened German 131
st
 Infantry Division arrived through 
train from Vitebsk to Lyobml, west of Kovel. To make things worse, neither the 
Wiking Division was in better shape. After its mauling in Cherkassy, it was posted in 
Poland to recuperate. Gille reported that his formation could only muster small arms 
and was without heavy weapons or vehicles. Light machine-guns and ammunition 
were rushed from Warsaw, while trains were requisitioned to carry reinforcements to 
Kovel. On arrival, Gille was greeted with alarming news: east of Kovel, the Germans 
met strong opposition and made a tactical withdrawal.
140
 The trains were attacked by 
the Soviets; some were abandoned, while in others their occupants were pinned down. 
Two Wiking Division's regiments tried to advance into Kovel, but 4 Soviet rifle 
divisions and anti-tank obstructions denied any further progress. Thus, Kovel should 
be turned into a "fester-platz".       
 Just as Tarnopol, Kovel should force the Soviets to besiege it, until a relief 
counterattack could be launched. Kovel's garrison consisted of German replacement 
units, engineer troops, men of the Reichsarbeitdienst ("Reich's Labor Service") and 
some SS soldiers. Opposing them were at least 2 Soviet Cavalry corps supported by 
local partisan groups and airplanes.
141
      
 The German 42
nd
 Corps was assigned to launch a relief attack and punch 
through the enemy lines to reach Kovel; the 131
st
 Infantry Division would advance 
along the railroad. The Wiking Division would provide flank protection, and later 
would be relieved by the Hungarian 7
th
 Infantry Division.    
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 On 20 March, the 131
st
 Infantry Division commenced with the advance, and 
successfully overcame the enemy resistance. By the evening of 22 March it was only 
10 kilometers from Kovel. However, Soviet resistance became stiffer, and the snow-
covered and swampy terrain made the German breakthrough costly and time-
consuming. Additionally, the partisans increased their attacks against the railroad west 
of the front, but the Germans could repair the damage and remove the obstacles. 
Reports from inside Kovel indicated that the Soviets were gradually subduing the 
defenders.          
 On 26 March, the German 42
nd
 Corps was placed under the command of the 
2
nd
 Army – part of Army Group Center. The 56th Panzerkorps – comprised of the 4th 
and 5
th
 panzer divisions and a light infantry division – launched an attack west of the 
Brest-Litovsk highway to relieve the encircled forces.
142
 Reinforcements arrived in 
the form of Panther tanks for the Wiking Division and assault guns for the 131
st
 
Infantry Division.         
 On 30 March 1944, after 18 hours of fighting and with cover provided by a 
snow-blizzard, tanks and troops of the Wiking Division, successfully infiltrated 
Kovel, early in the morning, and temporarily established a direct contact with the 
garrison. The Soviets unleashed repeated counterattacks; nevertheless, the Germans 
held, while the Luftwaffe managed supplying adequately the relief forces.  
 By 5 April, the 56
th
 Panzerkorps attacked and penetrated the city from the 
north and northwest. Eventually the city of Kovel had been relieved. Although 
firefights in the vicinity went on, the area remained relatively quiet until June 1944. 
Hitler and his OKH expected a major Soviet offensive in Western Ukraine. However, 
in 22 June 1944, the Soviets unleashed Operation Bagration against Army Group 
Center, and the Germans moved reinforcements from Ukraine to stem the Red tide in 
Belorussia.        
 Nevertheless, Marshall Konev's 1
st
 Ukrainian Front – comprised of 72 rifle 
divisions (1,000,000 troops) 1,614 armored vehicles, 14,000 artillery pieces, and 
2,086 aircraft – was powerful enough to unleash its own attack.   
 Against this juggernaut, General Josef Harpe's Army Group North Ukraine 
deployed 5 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division and 34 infantry divisions with 
900,000 troops, 900 armored vehicles, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 700 aircraft.
143
 
During the winter lull, the Germans had created three defensive lines – the third being 
the "Prinz Eugen Stellung"
144
 – while the towns of Volodymyr-Volynsky, Brody, 
Zolochev, Rava Russkaya, and Stanislav became defensive strongpoints. Although 
imposing, these defenses were thinly manned.      
 The initial Soviet objective was to capture the major road to Lvov, necessary 
for rapid advance, and isolate the General Artur Hauffe's German 13
rd 
Army Corps, 
which barred the way. The strongest German force concentration was the 3
rd
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Panzerkorps, deployed from Lvov to Brody, and was expected to bore the brunt of the 
offensive.          
 Konev's forces did not employ any maskirovka;
145
 by 13 July, the Germans 
could hear the rumble of enemy tanks moving, heralding the imminent offensive. 
Against Brody, Konev assembled two groups (northern, southern) with a combined 
strength of 45 rifle divisions, 7 Cavalry/Mechanized corps, 53 tank brigades, and 
overwhelming air support.        
 The offensive began with an enormous six-hour artillery bombardment 
followed by an unprecedented concentration of materiel and masses of infantry. The 
Soviets achieved breakthroughs in Horochow and Koltov, north and south of Brody 
respectively. By 14 July, the 13
rd 
Corps had been isolated from its two neighboring 
corps, while local German counterattacks achieved nothing.
146
   
 In 15 July the understrength 1
st
, 8
th
, 16
th
, and 17
th
 panzer divisions were 
thrown into battle to close the two gaps. Soviet close-support airplanes hammered 
them at low altitude, while the Luftwaffe's response was insignificant.  
 The 8
th
 Panzer Division clashed with superior enemy forces, and was bloodily 
halted. The 1
st
 Panzer Division, after temporarily containing the enemy, withdrew 
towards the Prinz Eugen Position. However, in some places the Soviet forces came 
there first.         
 Following an enormous artillery preparation and air attacks, masses of T-34 
tanks and infantry were launched throughout 15-17 July. Then, the Soviets took 
Zloczow and reached the Bug.        
 On 18 July, the Soviet forces linked up. After 6 days of desperate fighting the 
13
th
 Corps – comprised of Korpsabteilung C, 361st Infantry Division, 454th Security 
Division and the 14
th
 SS-Galizien Division – was encircled. The Brody pocket 
contained 65,000 troops; the same day they received orders to break out  
 The Soviets exerted heavy pressure from the north and east, swampy and 
forested terrain laid to the west; only the south offered a possible escape route. The 
breakout commenced, early on 20 July; rearguards of the attack were the SS-Galizien, 
361
st
, and 454
th
 divisions.        
 The Soviets repulsed another relief attack, and with all radio communications 
were out, many units were already attempting to escape on their own.   
 On 20 July, elements from within the pocket managed to reach the 1
st
 Panzer 
Division in the Zukow area. In the same day, a kampfgruppe from the same division 
made a last attempt to relieve the trapped forces. It managed to create an opening into 
the pocket about 10 kilometers west of Zalesia, through which about 3,000 soldiers of 
various units - including 400 Waffen-SS Galicians – managed to escape. Panic and 
confusion reigned supreme: thousands, of wounded, sick, and physically/mentally 
wrecked men, struggled to escape.
147
       
 During the following days, the 1
st
 and 8
th
 panzer divisions withdrew, leaving 
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the 13
th
 Corps to its fate.        
 On 21 July the Red Army started relentlessly reducing the pocket. Groups of 
German soldiers stormed desperately the enemy blocking positions. Some fortunate 
managed to escape; most, however, were massacred.    
 By late afternoon, 22 July 1944, Brody's pocket was finally reduced. The 
Soviets reported 30,000 enemy soldiers killed and 17,000 captured; 12,000 might 
have escaped. 
 
FINAL BATTLES AND SURRENDER OF THE SS-GALIZIEN 
The Ukrainian Military Board from Lvov reported that 10,000 soldiers of the SS-
Galizien Division were killed in the Brody pocket; although the most probable figure 
is of 7,000 killed and 3,000 managing to escape from the cauldron.   
 On 27 July 1944, the troops of the Soviet 1
st
 Ukrainian Front took Lvov 
clearing Western Ukraine from German forces.     
 The Galician SS survivors crossed the Dniester River and headed southwest to 
the Carpathians at a fast pace to avoid the Soviet advance. Occasionally, there were 
some air attacks, and skirmishes with Soviet spearheads. Eventually the Division 
stopped at Seredne in Carpatho-Ukraine for rest and recuperation.    
 On 24 July, the Division reached the Uzhotsky Pass. By now thousands of 
civilians had joined them. Once in Slovak territory the soldiers and civilians had 
passed into safe territory since the Tiso's regime had offered asylum to Galician 
refugees. Around 500 men continued marching until they reached a temporary 
assembly area in the village of Spas on the northern slopes of the Carpathians. So far, 
they had marched around 241 kilometers. While passing from UPA-controlled, the 
insurgents urged the Waffen-SS soldiers to defect. Few actually did.  
 Otto Wächter joined the Division and personally inspected its remnants to 
boost their morale. Throughout August, the Division reorganized itself. Its field 
replacement battalion linked up, other survivors appeared and regrouped, while 
damaged weapons and equipment were repaired. By late August, the strength of the 
SS-Galizien stood at 3,000 men. The Division's 8,000 strong Training and 
Replacement Regiment was at Neuhammer, while other remained in officer, NCO, 
and specialist schools in Germany.
148
      
 In a meeting with Freitag in Berlin, Himmler praised the Division's efforts in 
the Brody pocket, maintaining that it could be utilized in the future. On 7 August, 
Himmler ordered the Division's reforming around those assembled at Seredne. Freitag 
and his staff went to Neuhammer to assist in the regrouping. Afterwards, they flew to 
Carpatho-Ukraine where they found their men confident, well-rested and organized 
into a brigade-sized element.         
 The Division concluded its reformation in Neuhammer, on 20 September 
1944, boasting 261 officers, 673 NCOs, and 11,976 enlisted men.
149
  
 On 22 September, the Division was ordered to dispatch a kampfgruppe to 
Slovakia. An anti-German uprising – later called the Slovak National Uprising – had 
erupted and the Germans decided to send in the Ukrainian Waffen-SS. Most of the 
Galicians volunteered into the kampfgruppe for they knew their relatives and families 
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were there. On 26 September, a battlegroup of 900 soldiers was formed under SS 
Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Wildner – a Slovak-German. Kampfgruppe "Wildner's" 
mission was to advance into Slovakia and clear the vicinity of the cities Bansk 
Bystrica and Zvolen from pro-Communist insurgency. Two days later, another 
directive from Berlin, ordered the entire Division into Slovakia.   
 Passing through Bratislava by train, in the afternoon of 29 September, the 
kampfgruppe disembarked in Zemianske-Kostolany's railway station, and 
immediately commenced with the operation.
150
 The stance of the locals was mixed 
towards this Slavic Waffen-SS formation; some were terrified, some were 
sympathetic, and others indifferent. On 30 September, Kampfgruppe "Wildner" was 
subordinated to SS-Kampfgruppe "Schill" a German unit fighting its way through 
Pohronie. During the next days they attacked the 3
rd
 Tactical Group "Gerlach" of the 
1
st
 Czechoslovak Army through the valley of River Hron in southwest Slovakia. 
Moving through central Slovakia, the Galicians cleared the region of any insurgent, 
thus, secured the uninterrupted movement through the critical road and railway 
system.           
 Meanwhile, the rest of the Division prepared to depart for Slovakia. Before 
leaving, on 15 October, General Freitag and his staff, reported to General Hermann 
Höfle, commander of the German forces in Slovakia. Höfle informed them that the 
uprising was backed by Moscow, but it was also supported by anti-German Slovaks. 
The insurgents were entrenched in the districts of Banska Bystrica and Zvolen, and 
once these areas were cleared, the revolt would be essentially quelled, except some 
final mopping-up actions.
151
 Furthermore Freitag was promised additional supplies 
and material, while the SS-Galizien would be posted into Zilina's district.  
 On 8 October 1944, the German commander in Slovakia reported that the SS-
Galizien Division entered Slovakia with 286 officers and 13,999 NCOs and soldiers. 
On 9 October, some units of the SS-Galizien invaded the area controlled by the 2
nd
 
Partisan Brigade on the mountain sides of Mala Tatra; the Slovak guerillas mistakenly 
identified the Ukrainians as "soldiers of the Vlasov Army".
152
 On 15 October, the 
Division's first echelons left Neuhammer. The German occupation command decided 
that the SS-Galizien Division would take control of northwestern Slovakia replacing 
the 178
th
 Panzergrenadier Division "Tatra", in order to be used against the Slovak 
resistance in the area of Mala and Velka Fatra. Later it covered the rear of SS-
Sonderregiment "Dirlewanger", which also joined the counterinsurgent operations in 
14-18 October 1944. The deployment of the SS-Galizien allowed the withdrawal of 
German troops from northwestern Slovakia before the general offensive. 
Kampfgruppe "Schäfer" was redeployed to Komarno where it joined the core of the 
18
th
 SS-Panzergrenadier Division Horst Wessel tasked to strike the insurgents from 
the Hungarian border.
153
         
 The units of the Galician Waffen-SS Division started operations against the 
resistance in northwestern Slovakia. According to German reports "the division was 
successful in several punitive actions" resulting in the "retreat of strong groups of the 
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gangs towards the border of the protectorate".
154
 On 15 October, General Höfle, 
ordered the creation of a second Kampfgruppe "Wittenmayer" – boasting 3,000 
soldiers – from the SS-Galizien Division, tasked with attacking the guerillas in central 
Slovakia.          
 The Slovak insurgents spotted and were heavily engaged with Kampfgruppe 
"Wittenmayer" and a German armored train in the position "Kosatec" during 22-25 
October.           
 On 18 October battlegroup "Schill" and Sturmgeschutz elements from the 
battlegroup "Wildner" captured Krupina and then turned northwards. The Galician 
soldiers fought ferociously, especially after hearing that "Bolshevik partisans" have 
captured many families of Ukrainian refugees.      
 After breaching the last defensive line in Bardin-Vlkanova, the Ukrainians 
marched into the heart of the uprising, Banska Bystrica, on 27 October. For their 
actions, they were decorated by the pro-Nazi Slovak leader, Jozef Tiso, on 30 October 
1944.
155
          
 Until late January 1945, the Division performed occupation duties in Slovakia. 
Additional direct occupation was performed by the Einsatzgruppe H, 
Sicherheitspolizei, Sicherheitsdienst, Gestapo, Hlinka's Guardsmen, and 
Volksdeutsche "home-defense" units. All the aforementioned forces persecuted, 
pacified and killed insurgents, anti-fascists, illegal workers, racially "undesirable", 
and resistance sympathizers.
156
       
 In the areas of Smerycany and Maluzina of central Slovakia, the Galicians 
attacked the civilian population. In Smerycany, Kampfgruppe "Wittenmayer" razed a 
village using artillery and mortars. The civilians were driven out, 80% of their 120 
houses were burned down and 4 people died. In the raid of Nizna Boca, another 5 
people were killed.
157
 Also the Galicians used their Russian (Ukrainian) language to 
deceive the local population by creating pseudo-insurgent units, and gather 
information about the resistance.
158
 
 
On 25 January 1945, the – re-designated – 14.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS 
(ukrainische Nr.1) was ordered to move from Slovakia to Lower Steiermark region, 
Austria. Berlin wanted to use the Ukrainians against Mashall Tito's Yugoslav 
partisans in Maribor, Slovenia.       
 At the start of redeployment, the Division was divided into three marching 
groups – "A", "B", "C". The lack of sufficient railway transport and the exposure of 
main roads to Allied air attacks meant that they would have to march more than 480 
kilometers over high terrain in mid-winter.      
 After entering Austria on 6 February, by 28, the Division had arrived in Lower 
Steiermark.           
 In this mountainous area there were 5 partisan brigades in the 4
th
 Partisan 
Operational Zone.
159
 The Galicians, along with SS and SD units, fought a bitter 
guerilla war, crueler from what they have experienced in Slovakia. The two anti-
partisan operations conducted by the SS-Galizien were a complete failure. Tito's 
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partisans were a large, capable force with many of their leaders being former army 
officers, as well as Anglo-American advisers.      
 On 1 March 1945, divisional strength stood at 14,000 but would increase 
several days later when in the vicinity of Graz, a "Ukrainian Self-Defense" unit of 
Volhynian pro-Melnykite refugees joined them. Additionally, there were other 
Ukrainians from Hilfswilliger and Schuma units, concentration camps personnel, 
Ostarbeiter, POWs, and refugees that looked upon the Division as a haven while 
Germany was collapsing.
160
        
 On late March, there was a confusion regarding the deployment of units. Some 
believed that the SS-Galizien was to be absorbed by the 10
th
 Fallschirmjäger Division 
or be disarmed as "unreliable", for by that time many collaborationist formations 
began to self-disintegrate. Eventually, on 31 March, the Division was posted to Army 
Group South's 2
nd
 Panzer Army.     
 Meanwhile, elements of Marshall Fyodor Tolbukhin's 3
rd
 Ukrainian Front, and 
the newly created 1
st
 Bulgarian Front moved towards Maribor, whilst the Yugoslav 
partisans were re-organizing themselves as a regular army. The Soviet 57
th
 Army 
broke the German lines, and the SS-Galizien was ordered to advance northwards to 
the vicinity of Gleichenberg and Feldbach, into Austria.
161
 By nightfall of 1 April, all 
Ukrainian units have crossed the border, and in many sectors, the Division engaged 
with Soviet vanguards.         
 In the village of Gleichenberg the Galicians fought fiercely with Soviet 
elements located in west and southwest, while they successfully secured the medieval 
Gleichenberg castle after close-quarter combat with Soviet troops from the elite 3
rd
 
Guards Airborne Division. Meanwhile, General Freitag became unnerved and 
announced to his subordinates his resignation. He was bitterly reprimanded and 
ordered to remain at his post.
162
       
 In mid-April, the Division was transferred to General Hermann Balck's 6
th
 
Army. Balck assigned in turn the Galicians to the 4
th
 SS-Panzerkorps of SS General 
Herbert Gille. An element of 1,000 Galician Waffen-SS soldiers, have fought under 
Gille's command with the Wiking Division at Modlin, near Warsaw, in autumn 
1944.
163
          
 A notable event took place on 19 April, when the Ukrainian General Pavlo 
Shandruk (1889-1979) – who had served as a general in Petlyura's army – paid a visit 
to all units including those on the frontline. He was the new head of the Ukrainian 
National Committee and, by recent order of Andrey Levytsky, was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrayinska Natsionalna Armiya ("Ukrainian National 
Army" – UNA).         
 Before his visit, Shandruk intended to rename the Division into the 1
st
 
Ukrainian Division, and use it as base for the formation of the UNA. Although on 12 
November 1944, the Division was officially re-designated as "Ukrainian" many of its 
members were unaware of the fact. Following Himmler's approval, on 27 April, 
Shandruk issued the Divisional Order 71, to officially retitle the Division. Now the 
Ukrainians swore their allegiance to the Ukrainian nation.
164
 At the time Shandruk 
was organizing the UNA, approximately 220,000 Ukrainians were within various 
German services. Shandruk sought to assemble them to create an army. However, the 
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chaotic situation in the closing weeks of the war, made this work impossible. 
 By May 1945 Germany's fate was sealed; Hitler had already committed 
suicide, on 30 April, while the Red Army stormed the last defenses in Berlin. General 
Balck summoned his subordinate commanders and informed them about the imminent 
German surrender. To avoid being captured by the Soviets, the 6
th
 Army's front would 
disengage from them on 7 May and quickly retreat westwards to surrender to the 
Anglo-Americans.
165
         
 In 8 May, the Division received its last order to withdraw immediately to the 
vicinity of Volkermarkt. However, the Soviets noted this and began chasing them. 
There were some skirmishes and Soviet airplanes attacked the Ukrainian columns. 
While retreating, the Galicians abandoned their heavy equipment, and crayoned upon 
evacuated bunker walls inscriptions writing "Death to Stalin!", "Slava Ukraini [Glory 
to Ukraine]!", and "We'll be Back!"
166
 On 10 May, Wächter visited for the last time 
his brainchild and the Division made a last tactical displacement relocating its 
headquarters to Sankt Andrä        
 The Divisional command learned that the Allies were interning various foreign 
and Waffen-SS units near Tamsweg. Wächter and his associates disappeared in the 
mountains, Fritz Freitag committed suicide, and his chief-of-staff Captain Wolf 
Dietrich-Heike assumed divisional command. Dietrich-Heike contacted with the 
British 5
th
 Army Corps in Klagenfurt, arranging the surrender of 9,000 Ukrainians and 
1,000 Germans from the SS-Galizien. Some 500 crossed into Germany and 
surrendered to the Americans, requesting to join the rest of their unit. Undoubtedly, 
some individuals blended with other prisoners, and some unlucky were handed-over 
to the Soviets; if not forthwith executed, they were deported to gulags experiencing a 
slow, painful death. Small groups of hardliners unwilling to surrender tried to cross 
into Germany, Switzerland, and France. Others stayed hidden in the Austrian 
mountains, re-emerging after months or even years.
167
    
 The British allowed the Division to retain its small arms and instructed them 
to cross over to Italy. They set off on 28 May 1945, ending up to Rimini. There they 
were not placed in a POW cage, but in a Camp 374 for "Separated Enemy Personnel". 
 
On 5 July 1945, the Personal Representative of the US President to the Pope received 
a diplomatic note from the Vatican Secretariat of State, requesting for the "several 
thousand Ukrainians" in Germany to be allowed to take refuge in "France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, or any other country" and not being extradited to USSR.
168
 
 On 11 August the Vatican Secretariat of State delivered another diplomatic 
note on behalf of the displaced persons of Ruthenian Catholic Rite in Germany. The 
Vatican's lawyers tried to arrange an amnesty from the Oriental Congregation 
claiming that these Ukrainians were not Red Army deserters, but actually Greek-
Catholic Galicians, of Polish citizenship before 1939. Thus, the Yalta agreements
169
 
can only apply to Soviet citizens who were formerly Red Army's servicemen.
 Pressure increased when Bishop Bohachevsky of Pittsburgh sent a letter on 25 
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August to General George Marshall (1880-1959) who was Chief-of-Staff of the US 
Army, insisting that all Ukrainians within American occupation zone should be given 
asylum.
170
 
 After additional diplomatic notes, the US State Department issued, on 23 
January 1946, a "new directive"; from now on, only Ukrainians who were both 
residents and citizens of USSR after 1939 were liable to forcible extradition. 
 Eventually, by the summer of 1947, the British government – under Cold War 
geopolitical calculations, and the increasing pressure of Ukrainian émigrés – decided 
the wholesale transfer of the SS-Galizien Division to Britain "until the matter could be 
resolved." 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOVIET SUPPRESSION AND 
UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST REVIVAL, 1944-2013 
 
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1944-1956 
By August 1944, the Red Army had recaptured all Galicia. Antipathy to the Soviet re-
occupation was such that entire villages fled to the woods.   
 Until early 1945, the Germans kept supplying the UPA by air to continue 
harassing the Soviet rear. At the peak of its strength, the nationalist insurgency fielded 
between 25,000-40,000 guerillas. The total number of those engaged in any way with 
the insurgency in 1944-1950, was about 400,000 people.
171
 The guerillas secured 
weapons by abandoned German small arms, raids on Soviet units, or brought by Red 
Army deserters.        
 Already by spring 1944, almost every Western Ukrainian peasant household 
had prepared dugouts in which they concealed weapons, ammunitions, food stocks, 
and clothing, and could also be used as hideouts. The Soviet forces discovered 28,969 
such hideouts in Western Ukraine.
172
       
 The re-occupation was definitely not an easy task. The population was almost 
totally antipathetic, and adept at undermining state authority. The best Soviet military 
units were at the front until late 1945; thus, Moscow had to rely on the local party and 
administrative apparatus that had no military experience and little support from the 
locals.           
 However, during the winter 1944-1945 extensive Soviet security operations 
reduced the insurgency. Additionally, Moscow offered amnesty to those surrendered, 
repeating the offer several times. On 28 May 1946, in a top-secret communique to 
Nikita Khrushchev, the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs, Timofey Strokach 
(1903-1963), summarized the blow dealt – so far – to the nationalist underground in 
Western Ukraine, with 85,571 military/paramilitary operations, and ambushes killing 
110,825 "nationalist bandits", and other illegals, while arresting 250,676 persons.
173
 Although decimated, the Ukrainian insurgency managed to assassinate 11,725 
Soviet functionaries and collaborators, injure 3,914, and presumably kidnap another 
2,401.
174
 As late as 1948, in Lvov oblast, there were 635 reports of underground 
activity, and 835 assassinations of Soviet agents and local collaborators. Nevertheless, 
the guerillas could never hope to keep controlling extensive areas as they did during 
the war. Soviet numerical/technical/organizational superiority meant that only remote 
mountainous villages could be maintained as secure bases. The insurgents relied on 
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stealth to visit villages for provisions and information. To avoid reprisals, guerillas' 
families concealed their ties with them. 
The first two years after the war ended, were marked by severe hardships. The famine 
of 1946-47, followed by tighter agricultural control was met by the passive peasant 
resistance to collectivization, while the OUN-UPA targeted the kolkhoz's chairmen.
175
 The nationalist underground also boycotted the mobilization of locals to the 
Red Army in August 1944, by means of false lists, mass failure to appear at the 
recruitment center, and distributing leaflets urging the population to avoid service.
176
 
The insurgency's ranks received an influx of youths seeking to escape Red Army's 
draft.            
 Not all the deserters joined the insurgency, however. Some formed bandit 
groups that robbed and terrorized the region, as well as fighting both the OUN-UPA 
and the Soviet authorities.         
 The Soviet security forces were far more capable than the Germans in dealing 
with insurgents. A network of informers has been created that infiltrated the 
nationalist underground. Already by summer 1944, the OUN issued orders of 
eliminating Soviet undercover agents by any methods; shooting, hanging, and even 
quartering with a note on their chests: "For collaborating with the NKVD." Other 
instructions included violent reprisals against individual collaborators and their entire 
families.
177
 For example, in Lvov oblast, in August 1944, two whole families of 
suspected Soviet sympathizers had their eyes gouged out, one by one, and, afterwards, 
their bodies were hacked to pieces in front of their horrified fellow-villagers.
178
 
 Moscow responded with propaganda and false-flag operations. Special Soviet 
units disguised as nationalist insurgents committed atrocities, employing the 
mutilation of dead guerillas' corpses to terrorize the insurgents and the local 
population. Moreover, Soviet propaganda tried depicting the insurgents as gangs of 
Nazi butchers who terrorized Galicia-Volhynia. In one such case in mid-March 1946, 
the peasants lynched a captured insurgent forced by the Soviet authorities to confess 
the details of his guilt. Then, the villagers denounced the insurgency and its 
supporters living among them.
179
 There were many Ukrainians who either influenced 
by Soviet propaganda or by pure pragmatism collaborated with the state. The number 
of Communists in Western Ukraine grew to 33,165 by 1945, and to 74,993 by 1949; 
in 1946, the local pro-Soviet militia boasted 63,712 fighters.
180
 
The Greek-Catholic Church was also subjected to Soviet repression. Though the 
relations of OUN-UPA with the clergy were fluctuated, the Uniate Church's 
persecution was perceived as suppression of the Ukrainian national identity. 
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 Initially, however, Stalin was ready to tolerate the Greek-Catholic Church, 
because he tried to establish relations with the Vatican. Metropolitan Sheptytsky, 
realized that, and demonstrated a remarkable political flexibility condemning the 
nationalist underground.       
 When Sheptytsky died in November 1944, Bishop Iosif Slipyi succeeded him. 
In December, he sent a delegation to Moscow to assure the Soviet government for the 
Greek-Catholic Church's loyalty. Stalin wanted to utilize her influence to undermine 
the nationalist insurgents and convince them accepting the amnesty.
181
   
 Nevertheless, by spring 1945, Moscow's attitude changed drastically due to 
the deterioration in Soviet-Vatican relations, Uniate hierarchy's failure to strongly 
denounce the OUN-UPA, and because many priests remained sympathetic towards 
the insurgency.        
 Stalin understood the need to tolerate Catholicism in the Baltics, but he 
preferred to get rid of the Greek-Catholic Church – a hybrid of Orthodoxy and 
Catholicism – and extend the authority of his obedient Russian Orthodox Church over 
the troublesome Western Ukraine.
182
 In March 1945, Stalin issued a directive for the 
incorporation of the Greek-Catholic Church to Russian Orthodoxy. In April-May 
1945, Metropolitan Slipyi, 5 bishops and several prominent clergymen were arrested 
for refusing to consider conversion.
183
 Havryil Kostelnyk (1886-1948) was appointed 
head of an "initiative group" seeking to incorporate the Uniate Church into the 
Russian Orthodoxy. Kostelnyk was the pastor of Lvov's largest cathedral, and head of 
the "Easternizer" faction wanting to purge the Greek-Catholic Church of Catholic-rite 
borrowings. Kostelnyk hated the nationalist insurgency since his three sons were 
killed while serving in the SS-Galizien and the UPA.    
 After the hierarchy's decapitation, conversion to Orthodoxy proceeded rapidly, 
with 800 of the 1,997 Greek-Catholic priests joining the "initiative group", by October 
1945.
184
          
 The final blow to the Greek-Catholic Church came on 8 March 1946, when a 
sobor ("council") of the hierarchy gathered in Lvov, accusing the Vatican of 
protecting Germany from war crimes' responsibility. They decided to "abrogate the 
Unia, separate from the Vatican, and turn to the Holy Orthodox faith of our 
forefathers."
185
 In 1945-1950, hundreds of Greek-Catholic priests were imprisoned, 
and several died during the investigation.      
 Moreover, Khrushchev secured Stalin's approval to murder Teodor Romzha, 
Archbishop of Uzhgorod, after baselessly claiming that he supported the OUN-UPA. 
In October 1947, the MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) arranged a "car 
accident" that injured Romzha. While in hospital, a nurse-agent killed him by 
injecting him curare.
186
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 The insurgency responded by recruiting or even forcing priests to become its 
informers. In July 1946, the OUN issued an ultimatum to the converted priests to 
repudiate publicly their defection or suffer "executive measures"; the OUN murdered 
dozens of priests. Havryil Kostelnyk was assassinated, in 20 September 1948, for his 
pro-Soviet activity. 
Already by mid-1943, nationalist anti-Soviet guerilla movements in USSR sought 
realigning themselves in the coming Cold War era. Additionally, American state 
functionaries, accompanying the army in Europe, began covertly recruiting German 
officers and their non-German counterparts throughout Soviet-occupied Central and 
Eastern Europe.         
 Months before May 1945, POWs captured by the Anglo-Americans were 
reviewed as potential assets against Moscow. This practice became so widespread that 
German officers and their collaborators stockpiled intelligence before surrendering, 
hoping to use it as bargain with the Allies.
187
 A notorious case was that of Reinhard 
Gehlen (1902-1979) – leading member of the Abwehr – who along with some of his 
associates were removed from the POWs' list in American custody. In 1946, Gehlen 
set up an intelligence network named Gehlen Organization or "Org", and, in 1956, 
became the first head of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst ("Federal Intelligence 
Service" – BND).         
 Gehlen relied on the OUN's Foreign Center in Munich, headed by Stepan 
Bandera, for getting information about Ukraine. Bandera was released by the 
desperate Germans, in September 1944, in a vain attempt to raise a Ukrainian army. 
Nevertheless, he managed to form a German-Ukrainian intelligence network before 
the war ended. After Germany's defeat, Bandera was secreted away by officers of the 
US Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) in Munich, and, in July 1945, he had 
established the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, a coalition of anti-Soviet émigrés.188 
In June 1946, an MGB special team was tasked with locating and kidnapping 
Bandera. However, they realized that he was relocated to the Munich's Gotha region; 
there Bandera was guarded by his own men, American agents, as well as from 
members of a Bavarian underground comprised of former leading Hitler-Youth, SS, 
and Nazi Party members. All were closely connected with Bandera's informants-
network spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
189
   
 Despite repeated American assurances, Bandera was never extradited to 
USSR. Nevertheless, in 15 October 1959, Bandera died after being poisoned by a 
KGB agent.         
 Another recruited asset was Mykola Lebed, head of UHVR and the SB-OUN. 
By 14 February 1947, in exchange for American support, Lebed's insurgents would 
perform espionage, terrorist and covert operations for Washington. This secret offer 
led to a breakdown in his relations with Bandera. Lebed sought sanctuary at the 
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Ukrainian Catholic theological seminar in the Vatican, offering his full cooperation to 
the US authorities. By December, the CIC safely smuggled Lebed's family from 
Rome to Germany. From that time, Lebed and his associates became a key component 
in the CIA's covert operations on USSR. Washington supplied with airdrops the 
Galician insurgents.        
Soviet intelligence had captured German reports regarding British support to Polish 
and Ukrainians anti-Soviet guerillas. An intelligence report from Army Group North 
Ukraine, dated 21 September 1944, claimed that "in April 1944 the UPA contacted 
the British through its leader, Mykola Lebed." Another report by the Abwehr, dated 9 
November 1944, noted that the British were supplying the UPA with captured 
German weapons; one UPA unit was described as having 18 British airplanes at its 
disposal and was regularly supplied by air.
190
     
 Initially, the Soviet intelligence leadership downgraded these reports as 
rumors deliberately spread by the OUN     
 However, Moscow's stance on the issue changed after Winston Churchill's 
(1874-1965) famous 5 March 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech.   
 Considering Churchill's speech as a herald of the Third World War, the OUN 
leadership assured its insurgents that a "war between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-
Americans is inevitable. The start of the war is planned for the spring or autumn 
1946."
191
 In the 12 following months, there was a dramatic upsurge in guerilla activity 
in Western Ukraine. Besides a flood of reports regarding detected foreign espionage 
in western areas of Ukraine and Belorussia, Khrushchev received a report, dated 14 
September 1946, by his deputy, describing OUN's expanded propaganda efforts and 
the entry from abroad to Drohobych oblast, of 80 armed "rebels", "equipped with new 
English uniforms."
192
         
 This climax utterly contradicted Khrushchev's claims of the region's 
pacification. Stalin temporarily replaced him with Lazar Kaganovich in April 1947. 
By 1949 the movement was essentially reduced to an underground organization. In 
late that year, the UPA issued an order to terminate guerilla actions, and on 5 March 
1950, a Soviet commando unit led by Pavel Sudoplatov – the assassin of Yevhen 
Konovalets – ambushed and killed Roman Shukhevych, in a village near Lvov. 
However, UPA's activities did not cease immediately.    
 In 1952, only two members of the central Provid remained in Western 
Ukraine: Vasyl Kuk who became the new UPA's commander, and Vasyl Halasa. On 
11 July 1953, the police caught Halasa and on 23 May 1954, Kuk.
193
 Isolated guerilla 
remnants continued operating until 1956, when they were finally eliminated by Soviet 
security forces. 
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TODAY'S LEGACY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
The insurgency's liquidation and the consolidation of Soviet rule suppressed the 
Galician separatism. The diaspora circles continued undeterred their work, while the 
development of the nationalist movement during the post-war period included further 
internal disaffiliations.         
 The OUN maintained its dominance among the Ukrainian diaspora in the 
West after the war. However, it went through another split in 1948; a smaller group 
was formed by Mykola Lebed, the OUN-zakordonnyi ("OUN-abroad" – OUN-Z), 
declaring its readiness to accept democratic principles.
194
 Throughout the Cold War, 
American, West-German, and British intelligence utilized the various Ukrainian 
nationalist factions in ideological warfare and covert actions against USSR. The CIA 
sponsored Lebed's immigration to America, protected him from prosecution for war 
crimes, and funded OUN-Z activists to form the core of the Proloh Research and 
Publishing Association, a pro-nationalist semi-academic publisher.
195
  
 As ardent totalitarians, the OUN-B cooperated with Franco's Spain, Chiang 
Kai-Shek's Taiwan, and various Eastern European far-right émigré groups, including 
former officials of the Tiso's regime, members of the Ustasha, the Romanian 
Legionnaires, and ex-Nazis.        
 As for the SS-Galizien veterans, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress – a lobby-
group founded on November 1940 – achieved the admission of around 2,000 Waffen-
SS veterans into Canada. They argued to the Canadian government that the SS-
Galizien had been "forcibly conscripted."
196
      
 Additionally, the Division's renaming and re-organization in the last days of 
the war has heavily emphasized. In Canada the veterans were organized as Bratstvo 
hol. Voiakiv 1-oi Ukrainskoi Dyvizii UNA ("Brotherhood of former soldiers of the 1
st
 
Division of the Ukrainian National Army") becoming a constituent member of the 
Ukrainian Canadian Congress.       
 While building their new lives in the West, most of them hoped for a 
showdown with the USSR; some were even training soldiers anticipating World War 
Three. Yevhen Pobihushchy, veteran of the "Roland Battalion" and the Waffen-SS 
Galizien, continued his fascist political activities for the rest of his life. As regional 
leader of the OUN-B in Baden-Württemberg and military adviser of the central OUN-
B Provid, he organized a military training camp outside Regensburg in August-
September 1948.
197
 Others, after 1945, turned democrat making political and 
academic careers. Indicatively, Volodymyr Kubiyovych edited the Encyclopedia of 
Ukraine; Petro Savaryn became chancellor of the University of Alberta; philologist 
Oleksa Horbatsch taught at the University of Frankfurt; Vasyl Veryha was the 
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chronicler of the SS-Galizien Division and co-editor of the veteran's journal Visti 
Kombatanta, as well as director of the Slavic collection at the University of Toronto 
Library; and Roman Drazhnovsky became rector of the Ukrainian Free University in 
Munich.
198
          
 When contacting with the wider society, the veterans generally omitted their 
Waffen-SS background; within their community, however, it was regarded as 
something prestigious. 
The Waffen-SS were designated a criminal organization at the Nuremberg Trial in 
1946. It was something that complicated the nationalist myth-making around the unit 
by its veterans and their admirers. After the war the SS-Galizien veterans denied any 
association with Nazi Germany and responsibility for war crimes. In 1987, Vasil 
Veryha, while being interviewed by the CBC radio, insisted that "I have never felt to 
be a Nazi.", "I am and I always was a Ukrainian patriot", "If you would ask me 
another question, if I would do the same thing all over, I would."
199
  
 The Division's apologists argue that its actions were justified as defense 
against Soviet oppression. While it is true that the Red Army committed war crimes in 
1944 as it moved through Western Ukraine, Poland and Germany, nevertheless, the 
SS-Galizien and the OUN-UPA were actively involved in the Holocaust and fought 
for the Nazis.           
 Diaspora circles developed a literature that denied OUN's totalitarianism, its 
collaboration with the Germans, and its involvement in atrocities. Instead, they 
present the organization as democratic and pluralistic that rescued Jews during the 
Holocaust. A remarkable contradiction, is the combined celebration of the supposedly 
OUN-UPA's anti-Nazi resistance with that of the SS-Galizien Division. Hence, 
Waffen-SS veterans could celebrate the insurgency's anti-Nazi resistance while 
belonging to the same veterans' organization.    
 This nationalist historical narrative was gradually imported to Ukraine after 
the country became independent on 24 August 1991. It was received well in Western 
Ukraine, but coldly or hostile in the eastern and southern regions.
200
  
 The Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko undertook substantial 
propaganda initiatives. In July 2005, he established an Institute of National Memory 
assigning it with researching the archives of the former KGB.    
After 1991, the OUN faced considerable difficulties re-establishing itself in 
independent Ukraine. It split between the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) 
in Ukraine and the émigré OUN-B, led by second-generation émigrés in Germany and 
Australia. Today, four organizations claim Bandera's heritage – KUN, OUN-B, the 
Tryzub imeni Bandery, and VO Svoboda.       
 VO Svoboda was originally founded in Lvov, in 1991, as the Social-National 
Party of Ukraine after the merge of various ultra-nationalist organizations and student 
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fraternities.          
 The party's symbol was the Wolfsangel ("wolf's hook") that was used by 
Waffen-SS divisions, and, after the war, by neo-Nazi organizations. The movement 
had a paramilitary guard, recruiting skinheads and football hooligans.
201
  
 After some years of decline, in 2004, the movement chose Oleh Tiahnybok 
(born 1968) as its leader. Modelling itself largely to Austrian and German mainstream 
far-right movements, he significantly improved the party's image. It was renamed to 
All-Ukrainian Association 'Svoboda' ("Freedom"), replacing the Wolfsangel with an 
image of three raised fingers in the national colors. By integrating Tiahnybok into 
the Nasha Ukraina ("Our Ukraine") faction of the Verkhovna Rada, Yushchenko 
provided legitimacy to Svoboda. A few months later, Tiahnybok delivered an 
inflammatory speech in which he celebrated the OUN-UPA for having "fought 
against the Moskali ["Muscovites"], Germans, Jews and other scum who wanted to 
take away our Ukrainian state!" and claimed that Ukraine was ruled by a "Muscovite-
Jewish mafia." Tiahnybok's caused his expulsion from Yushschenko's parliamentary 
faction.
202
          
 Svoboda presents itself as the successor of the OUN. Tiahnybok regards it as 
"an Order-party which constitutes the true elite of the nation." They also demanded 
the re-introduction of the Soviet "nationality" category into Ukrainian passports, 
subscribing to OUN's traditional national segregation. Thus, Svoboda's ultra-
nationalism is supplemented with traditional "white racism".
203
   
 During Yushchenko's last year in power, Ukrainian mainstream media gave 
disproportionate attention to Svoboda, especially after its impressive performance in 
the elections of March 2009 for the Tarnopol regional Rada, where it received 34.69% 
of the votes. Yushchenko suffered a disastrous defeat in 2010 receiving a historical 
5.5%. However, he left a legacy that legitimized Svoboda's ideology.    
 On 28 April 2011, Svoboda celebrated the 68
th
 anniversary of the 
establishment of the SS-Galizien Division. Octogenarian Waffen-SS veterans were 
honored as heroes, in a mass rally organized by Svoboda and the "autonomous 
nationalists." Nearly 700 participants marched through the streets of Lvov, shouting 
"One race, one nation, one fatherland!", and "Galizien-Division of Heroes!", 
"Shukhevych, Bandera – Heroes of Ukraine!" The demonstration was also organized 
by Svoboda – since October 2010 the largest party in Lvov's city council – which had 
decorated the city with posters praising the SS-Galizien as "the pride of the nation" 
and "they defended Ukraine."
204
 On 30 June 2011, the 70
th
 anniversary of the German 
invasion and Stetsko's proclamation of the Ukrainian state were re-enacted in Lvov 
with great festivities, where re-enactors paraded dressed in Waffen-SS uniforms. 
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Extremist football supporters designated Lvov as Banderstadt ("Bandera-city") at 
football games and other events.
205
 
The great moment for Svovoba came on November 2013. Viktor Yanukovych was the 
elected President of Ukraine since February 2010. Although supported by Russia, he 
maintained a policy of balance between Russia and the West. However, in 21 
November 2013 Yanukovych refused to sign the Ukraine-European Union 
Association Agreement, choosing to strengthen political-economic ties with Moscow. 
This triggered a massive wave of demonstrations by pro-Western Ukrainians 
demanding closer integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.   
 Soon, a veritable revolution erupted and Ukraine's age-old dilemma came once 
again to the surface. Pro-Russian and pro-Western protesters clashed throughout the 
country. Svoboda, and other various ultra-nationalist groups, including the Pravyi 
Sektor ("Right Sector") paramilitary extremist organization, were instrumental in 
organizing and leading the Euromaidan ("Euro-square") revolution, resulting in 
Yanukovych's overthrow. The deposed President fled to Russia.    
 A new provisional government came to power, comprised by a wider coalition 
of pro-Western parties with Svoboda being its main component. Along with 
Tiahynbok, several new political leaders emerged: Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Oleskandr 
Turchynov, and the famous boxer Vitali Klitschko. Yatsenyuk became interim Prime 
Minister and Turchynov acting President.       
 The Ukrainian nationalist coup was met by the secession of Crimea through a 
controversial referendum – held on 16 March 2014 – and the eruption of a localized 
civil war in the Donbass region, where pro-Russian separatists seek to form an 
independent "people's republic". Since then, Ukraine remains in turmoil. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ukrainian nationalism is essentially the "Galician" nationalism, since Galicia became 
the movement's historical cradle. Undoubtedly, the larger part of her population 
strongly identifies itself as an ethnos with its eyes turned to the West and its back to 
the East. What has started as nebulous concepts born from the minds of intellectuals, 
it evolved into a fully-fledged armed insurgency determined to achieve independence 
by any means.         
 Although ideologically it shared basic common characteristics with other 
European nationalist movements, Ukrainian nationalism was fundamentally 
influenced and depended on exogenous factors. Various major powers contributed 
decisively to its historical development as a force to be reckoned with, either 
supporting or suppressing it.        
 Western Ukraine, like the other regions comprising the so-called Eastern 
European Borderlands, has experienced much turbulence in its history, and the 
Second World War brought untold ruin, as well as a legacy of ethnic hatred.  The 
proponents of Galician self-determination and their adherents, have made clear 
historical choices; choices that had catalytic repercussions both for themselves and 
those around them. Regardless of every nation's inalienable right on self-
determination, the shadow of extremism falls heavily upon Ukrainian nationalism. No 
effort of revisionism can whitewash this fact.       
 The current Ukrainian crisis has awoken the ghosts of the past in a country 
seemingly doomed to never enjoy peace. 
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